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ABSTRACT
From the fall of the Afghan monarchy in 1973 to the fateful days of Taliban control,
Afghanistan has proved to be one of the most dangerous and unstable political
environments in South Asia, if not the world. Against this backdrop, Islamic
fundamentalist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has waged a continuous guerilla war to gain
control of the state. Towards this end, he has fought ambitious rivals, every Afghan
government, the Soviet Union, and now US forces sent to drive out al Qaeda and destroy
the Taliban. This thesis explores Hekmatyar's persistence in such a fluid and violent
political landscape, tracing his islamist Hezb-e Islami party's genesis and evolution in the
last 30 years. With a rigid Leninist-styled party, Hekmatyar's ability to draw from
religious, ethno-regional, and socioeconomic support, as well as foreign aid, has provided
him the means to survive and flourish during Afghanistan's enduring devastation.
Thesis Supervisor: Harvey M. Sapolsky
Title: Professor of Public Policy and Organization
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Chapter One:
Introduction
On May 6, 2002, a CIA-controlled Predator drone fired Hellfire missiles at Hezb-
e Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his associates on the outskirts of Kabul. After
the Afghan insurgent chief survived the strike, US intelligence officials acknowledged
they had targeted Hekmatyar. With so few acknowledged Predator air strikes, this
announced action underscores both the importance of his elimination to US forces and
the threat he poses to the Karzai government and US interests. After returning from exile
in Iran in February, Hekmatyar aligned himself with al Qaeda and Taliban remnants and
implicated himself in terrorist attacks against the Afghan government. 1 However,
Hekmatyar's recent attempts to overthrow the Afghan government represent merely the
latest manifestations of his longstanding insurgency campaign. For 30 years, he has both
contributed to and survived the high level of violence that is Afghanistan. He has fought
against the monarchy, the Soviets, the Taliban, as well as any Afghan standing in the way
of his quest for power. And now, he has targeted US forces and the Karzai government.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is a survivor in one of the world's most turbulent and violent
political environments. This thesis investigates Hekmatyar's persistence as an insurgent
in Afghanistan's fluid and constantly changing landscape
Answering this question requires a look at the origin of Hekmatyar's Hezb-e
Islami party, its actions during the Soviet invasion, and the years of the Taliban to the
present. I argue that Hekmatyar has cultivated a Leninist-styled party that can quickly and
I "U.S. Attack on Warlord Aims to Help Interim Leader," The New York Times, May 9 2002, Al5
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effectively switch bases of support, adapting to Afghanistan's constantly changing
political environment.
Although recent coverage has only examined Hekmatyar's cooperation with al
Qaeda and Taliban remnants, there is a larger story behind Hekmatyar's involvement in
Afghanistan. From an Islamist activist at Kabul University through his tenure as interim
Prime Minister to his current alliance with al Qaeda and the Taliban remnants,
Hekmatyar has had a violent and longstanding impact in Afghanistan for more than 30
years. He is indeed Afghanistan's persistent insurgent.
Hekmatyar's longstanding goal is to turn Afghanistan into an Islamic state
governed by the religious laws of Shari 'a. His Islamist ideology can be traced to the
Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood movement of 1928 and its more militant offshoots of the
1960s and 1970s.2 Islamist ideology stresses that the Islamic state can be established only
through political action, which is conducted outside of the mosque. The more militant
adherents of this ideology, such as Hekmatyar, Ayman al Zawahiri, and Osama bin Laden
believe that the use of violence is not merely justified, but necessary to achieve the
political revolution necessary to found the Islamic state.3
The formation of Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami group mIrrors the plethora of
University Muslim youth organizations which spawned Sunni Islamist militant groups
across the Muslim world, namely Egypt's Al Jihad which has merged with al Qaeda to
provide it the operational and logistical expertise to perpetrate September 11.4 Unlike the
2 Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1996),35. See
also Sana Abed-Kotob, "The Accomodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of
Egypt," International Journal of Middle East Studies, n27 (1995)
3 Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam ...35-6
4 For more on Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al Qaeda, see Peter Bergen, Holy War Inc. (New York: Free
Press 200 I) and Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random
House, 2002). These sources lack the sensationalism that permeates the literature on al Qaeda.
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other Afghan resistance groups fighting the Russians, Hezb-e Islami is a well-organized
Leninist style party that originated before the Soviet invasion. Once Pakistan's foremost
proxy and a major recipient of CIA funding to fight the Soviets, Hekmatyar fought on all
sides of the Afghan alliances. On two occasions, he served as the country's Prime
Minister until he was ousted by the Taliban and fled to Iran. Returning to Afghanistan in
the spring of 2002, Hekmatyar declared war on the US and is currently linked to al Qaeda
and the Taliban.5 Understanding Hekmatyar's persistence may help explain the success of
other rigid Islamist organizations operating in traditional, undeveloped, and fragmented
societies such as Algeria, Sudan, and Somalia. In addition it can gauge the threat
Hekmatyar poses to US regional and security interests.
In addressing his survivability, it will provide an historical explanation of
Hekmatyar and his rigid organization. Hekmatyar, an Islamist and anti-traditionalist with
no large representative base, has managed to not only maintain a well-anned fighting
force but also become Afghanistan's Prime Minister following the Soviet withdrawal
until his ouster by the Taliban militia in 1996. Hekmatyar's story is a testament to the
notion that a small highly organized group can playoff Afghanistan's fragmented society
to secure external support and command political authority.
Methods of Investigation
Fortunately, there is extensive literature on the Soviet invasion and the ensuing
civil war. In addition, there is a surprising amount of declassified documents to
corroborate or contest claims made journalists and academics. Following September 11,
journalists have scoured the country, producing many reports on the various factions.
Sensationalism par excellence is YossefBodansky's Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America
(New York: Prima Publishing 2001).
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That being said, there is no comprehensive account tracing Hekmatyar and his group
from the last days of Afghan monarchy through the Soviet invasion to the present.
A sizable portion of the literature on Afghanistan's civil war addresses the role of
traditionalism and Islam in anti-Soviet resistance. French scholar Olivier Roy provides a
focused look at radical Islam's role in the Afghan resistance. Although Roy coined the
term "Islamo-Leninst," to describe the Hezb-e Islami, he has neither explained his
definition nor applied it thoroughly to Hekmatyar's insurgency.6 Area experts such as
William Maley, Larry Goodson, and Barnett Rubin provide insightful and in depth
analysis alongside their methodical field research. Journalist Ahmed Rashid's look at the
Taliban provide a wealth of information on the role of fundamentalist and political Islam
in Afghanistan as well as an inside source on how the group stole Hekmatyar's ethnic and
regional bases of support.
Although there is little on Islamist organization, traditional organizational theory
literature offers a helpful lens to gauge Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami. Most particularly,
Phillip Selznick's The Organizational Weapon, which focuses on the Leninist "combat
party" provides insights on how an organization conducts itself and sets the mechanisms
for its goal to forcibly take power. With such a wide pool of sources on Leninism as a
strategy, there is a great deal to extract on this particular style of subversion and alliance
formation. Scholars such as Richard Pipes and Neil Harding have provided an immense
contribution to the understanding of this particular insurgency strategy.
5 Ben Barber, "Warlord Returns to Afghanistan," The Washington Times March 5, 2002
6 Olivier Roy, The Failure of Politicallslam ... In this source, Roy describes the Islamo-Leninist party as a
vanguard but does not explore their actions and how it relates to the subversion strategies and alliance
formation enshrined by Lenin. Roy's only example is the Muslim Brotherhood which differs greatly from
Leninist party described in this thesis. Roy does explain very well that the fusion of Islamism and Leninism
seems paradoxical.
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Declassified documents have also contributed focused yet significant insights on
the changing specifics of Afghanistan's constant conflict. US State Department
communications explore refugee conditions and political support among insurgents.
Reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency also
provide snapshots and particular nuances of the military balance during the Soviet
invasion.
Leninism - A Strategy of Subversion
Before exploring Hekmatyar's four different bases of support, it is crucial to
understand Leninism and its use of a political party as a weapon for subversion and the
seizing power. Much can and has been written on Lenin's contribution to Marxist
political thought. However, this study will focus on Leninism as means, an organizational
subversive strategy to seize power. Though a large portion of Lenin's insurgency strategy
deals with the global struggle against capitalism, this analysis will focus exclusively on
the internal dynamics used in a single country.7 Particularly in its relationship to
Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami and other non-Marxist actors, Leninist organization should
be seen as a tool or means rather than as a refinement of Communist thought. Philip
Selznick asserts that Leninism exists primarily as a political doctrine, and furthermore as
an organizational strategy, "a detailed design of weapons and strategy for continuous
conquest of power."s This chapter will explore Leninist organizational theory, as well as
7 To be sure, there is an international component to Islamist terrorist groups. However, the cohesiveness
does not come close to Lenin's International Communist movement. While the Muslim Brotherhood of the
late twentieth century displayed similar characteristics as well as a cohesive agenda, today's Islamist terror
network seems to be more of a loose, amorphous collection of like-minded groups exchanging spiritual,
financial, and technical advice and materiel.
8 Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (Glencoe, IL:
Free Press 1960) 41-2
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salient elements of its operational code, namely infiltration, propaganda, and alliance
formation.
The Leninists did not invent insurgency. Instead, they incorporated preVIOUS
subversion strategies with a greater focus on managerial organization and its relation to
acts of subversion.9 The Leninists also achieved a large degree of innovation in global
insurgency following the establishment of the Soviet Union by linking mutually
reinforcing vanguard parties by a common ideology as well material support orchestrated
from Moscow. 10 On the internal level, Lenin's innovation and adaptation of subversion
manifests itself in strategy and process. Richard Pipes contends that Lenin's adaptation
was in militarizing politics: "His innovation, the reason for his success, was militarizing
politics ... The objective of which was not to compel the enemy to submit but to annihilate
him. This innovation gave Lenin significant advantages over his opponents, for whom
warfare was either the antithesis of politics or else politics pursued by other means.,,11
Lenin concluded that playing by the rules and engaging in strictly legitimate endeavors
was insufficient to seize power. Open armed conflict would ultimately be used to seize
power, but by itself and without preparatory measures, it was unlikely to overthrow an
existing government with trained, equipped forces.12 It is such that Leninist subversion
falls between these two endpoints, using a militarized organization in both party politics
as well as political violence to maintain support and destabilize the existing government
to seize power.
9 Laurence W. Beilenson, Power Through Subversion (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press 1972)
Beilenson explains Lenin's adaptation of traditional subversion, as manifested in the French Revolution.
10 Laurence W. Beilenson, Power Through Subversion ... 144
II Richard Pipes, A Concise History of the Russian Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1995) 392
12 Laurence W. Beilenson, Power Through Subversion (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press 1972) 139
12
Centralized Leadership
The most apparent feature of a Leninist organization is a small, insulated, and
strong central leadership capable of issuing commands to its agents. Lenin's obsession
with a highly centralized vanguard leadership stemmed from a variety of concerns,
including utility and security. Lenin felt that only such a strong central nucleus could
organize efficiently and effectively to represent the working class and those it perceived
as oppressed by the government.13 Functionally, limiting control to a select few allowed
the Bolsheviks to counter the increased surveillance and sabotage operations conducted
by the Russian government at the beginning of the twentieth century.14 In criticizing the
Party rules, Trotsky explained accurately "The organization of the Party takes the place
of the Party itself; the Central Committee takes the place of the organization; and finally
the dictator takes the place of the Central Committee.,,15
Having looked at the party's top-level structures, one must now examine it from
the base. This hierarchy is not just spontaneously created, as Selznick writes, but rather
transitions from a voluntary association into the vanguard-led group. As a result,
participants outside the top leadership core transfonn from members into agents, even as
the organization maintains total control over the individual. 16 Membership is
characterized by extreme and unconditional devotion to the organization, and in essence,
its leadership. This extreme devotion allows the leaders to command the party in actions
that may conflict with its ideology. The enforced focus on loyalty, Richard Pipes argues,
clarifies the Bolsheviks' "un-Bolshevik" behavior, such as certain alliance fonnations, in
13 Neil Harding, Leninism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press 1996) 178-9
14 Neil Harding, Leninism ... 28
15 John P. Roche, The Histmy and Impact of Marxist-Leninist Organizational Theory (Cambridge, MA:
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 1984) 16
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their quest to seize power. The agents, while versed and indoctrinated in Marxist thought,
were not following ideological principles, but rather unquestionably following their
leaders' commands.17
Having explored the mission and structure of the Leninist organization, it is vital
to understand its specific means to seize power. Leninist adherents aiming to seize power
realize they are unpopular and represent a minority of the population as such, they tended
to view "any group or individual who was not a member of [the] party as ipso facto an
enemy, and hence a threat. . .It followed that such a person had to be silenced and
suppressed.,,18 However, to seize power, Leninist parties must effectively interact with
and ultimately manipulate society, institutions, and people that they oppose:
Rather, these features of the existing society not only can be used, they
must be used, if the party is to succeed. They are the material, the only
material, with which the party can work; they are the element. .. that makes
the wheels of history go around, and the party must act as the general staff
of social engineering in this interplay of forces. For the party, society
constitutes not a laboratory but a universe of forces, basically unfavorable
and hostile, but in which judicious manipulation can create a new balance
more favorable to the party's aims.19
The efficacy of Leninist subversive strategy rests in how well the unpopular group can
manipulate the institutions of society.
Propaganda
As Selznick maps out, the propaganda and printed media serves Leninist
organizations in two distinct fashions; it communicates insurgent tactics and regulations
16 Philip Selznick, The Organization Weapon ...40-50
17 Richard Pipes, A Concise History of the Russian Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1995) 115 For
the Bolsheviks, un-Bolshevik behavior included alliances with the German government during World War
I.The Germans provided the group with resources to destabilize Czarist Russia. As it will be explained
further on, Hekmatyar's party enters into similar un-Islamist
18 Richard Pipes, A Concise History ... I04
19 Alfred G. Meyer, Leninism (New York: Praeger 1962) 80
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and it provides operational guidance and goals. The act of printing propaganda is itself a
task that helps "train, prepared, and unite the rank and file" and ultimately develops the
party's organization?O To be sure, the Bolsheviks used propaganda as a bridge from the
centralized vanguard to the base of support. The means in which the Bolsheviks
disseminated their newspapers allowed them to strengthen their networks and infiltrate
select institutions:
Agents would be required in every locality, both to report on events and to
create a clandestine distribution network to the workers in local plants and
industries. They would be the party's links with grass roots support, and
they would communicate with regional agents of the party who, in their
turn, were to be responsible to the editorial board of the newspaper. The
editorial board itself would comprise proven veterans of the movement,
well-versed in theory and so able to generalise from the particular and to
anticipate the next phase of the struggle.21
Along with its latent organizing capacities, propaganda proves vital in paving the way for
seizing power. The key feature of Leninist propaganda is that the truth is irrelevant.
Instead, propaganda should adapt as the Party changes its line.22 While propaganda will
not neutralize the current government, it paves the way for effective infiltration of key
institutions.
Infiltration
Infiltration is central to Leninist subversive strategy in that it prepares agents to
target rivals and perpetrate destabilizing acts against the target government. As explained
above, the Leninists rejected exclusive open warfare against the well-armed government
in favor of subversive measures to include political violence. Infiltration, essential to the
20 Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon ... 50
21 Neil Harding, Leninism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press 1996) 31
22 Laurence W. Beilenson, Power Through Subversion ... 84
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Leninist strategy of subversion, entails the positioning of party agents within target
institutions and organizations.23 The Bolsheviks placed a high priority in infiltration,
advocating the piercing of every available institution. The participants at the second
Congress of the Communist International of 1920 proclaimed: "In every Soviet of
Workers' Deputies, in every trade and industrial union, cooperative association, factory,
tenants' union, in every government institution everywhere, even though there may be
only three people sympathizing with Communism, a Communist nucleus must be
immediately organized. ,,24 Selznick adds that Leninist hierarchy directly complements
infiltration. The efficacy of having a handful of agents positioned within key areas of a
university or government department will depend on how they are organized.25 For the
Leninists, the party leadership could instruct the infiltrating agents, who in turn are
exclusively loyal to the party leaders, to conduct any number of activities ranging from
propaganda and recruitment to espionage, sabotage and violent action. The agent's
consuming devotion and the leadership's hierarchical organization prove vital in the
party's ability to penetrate and exploit target institutions.
Alliance Behavior
Understanding Leninist alliance behavior aids greatly In illustrating its larger
subversive strategy. For the Leninist, alliance formation is strictly utilitarian and
determined by a common enemy. The goal of the alliance is to neutralize the common
threat.26 Alliances greatly benefit the Leninist party, as it provides greater numbers
23 I am drawing this definition of infiltration from Selnick's citing of the second Congress of the
Communist International (1920) in The Organizational Weapon as well as Alfred Meyer and Laurence
Beilenson's work on Leninism
24 Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon 66
25 Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon 66-7
26 Alfred G. Meyer, Leninism ...82
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against a common threat. It also allows the party to free ride, manipulate and take
advantage of its partners while providing relatively little in return. Given the extreme
distrust of those outside the party, Leninists view their alliance partners as enemies
themselves. Once they outlive their usefulness, they are to be dropped. As Alfred Meyer
elaborates, "They are considered undependable, treacherous, ill-willed, if not agents of
the bourgeoisie. Allies must be controlled by the party as much as possible lest they
obtain mastery over it. They must be abandoned and betrayed at the proper moment, lest
they anticipate the party by abandoning and betraying it.,,27Furthermore, Leninist parties
are very careful when allying with ideologically similar groups, as those partners
compete for the same social base. It should come as no shock that Leninist parties
infiltrate these ideologically similar parties.28 Alliance behavior is determined by threats
and opportunities. This can drive the Leninist to ally with a foreign power towards
destabilizing the government. Or when ideologically similar parties threaten the Leninist
party's social base, alliances with the group's traditional enemies may be more likely.
One need only look at Lenin's own alliance with the German government during and
after World War I and the post-War cooperation with conservative paramilitary forces
against the German socialists who opposed the Communist International. 29
Despite the lack of an existing comprehensive analysis of the group, scholars and
policymakers versed in the late twentieth century Afghan Civil Wars conclude that
27 Alfred G. Meyer, Leninism ...82
28 Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon ... 228
29 Richard Pipes, A Concise History ... 122 Alliances with the WWI Gennan government provided
substantial funding estimated at 50 million deutsche marks in gold - roughly 6-1Omillion dollars. This
proved instrumental is printing and distributing the Bolshevik Pravda propaganda newspaper. See also
John P. Roche, The History and Impact of Marxist-Leninist Organizational Theory ... 18 for the Bolshevik
alliance with the Gennan Freikorps.
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Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami is a well organized Leninist-styled party.30 The emphasis of
the Leninist strategy is the acquisition and consolidation of state power through
subversive acts to include political violence. This goal of seizing power is of highest
priority.
Chapter Review
Chapter two will explore the four bases of support from which Hekmatyar has
effectively drawn in the last 30 years. Chapters three, four, and five will chart Hekmatyar
and his Hezb-e Islami movement from the fledging days of the Afghan monarchy to the
present alliance with al Qaeda and the remnants of the Taliban. The conclusion will
examine policy relevant issues with Afghanistan today and the War on Terror.
30 For scholarly views on Hekmatyar's Leninist party see Olivier Roy's respected works: Olivier Roy, The
Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1996) and Olivier Roy, Islam and
Resistance in Afghanistan (New York: Cambridge University Press 1990). In the policy arena,
Congressman Charlie Wilson and CIA Case Officer Milt Bearden make observe Hekmatyar's Leninist
style: George Crile, Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in
HistOlY (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press 2003) and Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy:
The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB (New York: Random House 2003)
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Chapter Two:
Bases of Support
Although some parties are married to a particular base of support, Hekmatyar's
Leninist orientation has allowed him to draw from many different constituencies. In line
with this strategy, manipulating constituencies is simply a means towards the end of
conquest. This chapter will explore the four bases of support from which Hekmatyar has
drawn in the last thirty years. It will provide an overview of Afghanistan's cleavages and
divisions, and in doing so, briefly examine provide some important events in Afghan
history. The scope of history explored in this chapter has been limited to provide an
overview of Afghanistan's bases of support.31
The Ethno-Regional Base
Ethnic identity is a salient base of political parties around the world. In
aggregating their interests, groups form or are constructed by elites around a collective
identity.32 The application of the security dilemma to intrastate conflict provides insights
into the role of identity and its ability to consolidate groups afraid of subordination. The
fear of being dominating by a rival ethnic group feeds the security dilemma, triggering
greater group identity, the consolidation of power and armament. 33With such fears, the
ethnic or regional group's power status precedes and can often mask other issues such as
material and economic needs.34 Hekmatyar played off certain ethnic groups' fears of
31 For detailed histories on modem Afghanistan, see Olivier Roy's Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan
(New York: Cambridge University Press 1990), Willem Vogelsang's The Afghans (Oxford, UK: Blackwell
Publishers 2002)
32 For more on the creation of these parties, groups, and elite construction see Benedict Anderson, Imagined
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, UK: Verso 1983)
33 Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival v35 nl, Steven van Evera,
"Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security, v18 n4 (Spring 1994)
34 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 2000) 187
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dominance by others, forming alliances with them to supplement his party's inability to
consolidate territory of its own or cultivate broader Pashtun ties.
Table 1.1 Afghanistan's Main Ethnic Groups, 2002
Sources: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2002 (avaIlable at www.CIa.gov)
Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International
System (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press) 26
Group Population Percentage Location
Pashtuns 12,200,000 44 South and
Southeast,
although present in
most re~ions
Tajiks 6,940,000 25 North, Northeast,
and Kabul
Province
Hazaras 2,780,000 10 Center and Kabul
Province
Uzbeks 2,220,000 8 North
Minor Ethnic 3,610,000 13 Each group
Groups (Aimak, regionally
Turkmen, Baloch) concentrated
The Pashtuns
Amounting to a little less than half of the country's population, the Pashtuns
represent Afghanistan's dominant group. As shown in table 1.1, the Pashtuns are the
largest group, while the remaining population is divided among several smaller ethnic
groups. However, within the Pashtun group there are tribe, subtribe and clan
denominations. Pashtuns are split into tribes, the dominant being the Durrani and Ghilzay
tribes of South and Southeast Afghanistan.35 The majority of Pashtuns reside in the
southern and southeastern portions of the country, particularly those that border with
Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province and Balochistan, although there are considerable
amounts that have settled across the rest of the country, particularly in the Kabul area.36
Political power within most Afghan tribes is secular, with the mullah, the Muslim
35 Willem Vogelsang, The Afghans (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers 2002) 25
36 Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International
System (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press) 26
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religious leader, very low in influence and status.3? The Pashtuns employ a tribal code
known as Pashtunwali. Being anti-traditionalist, Hekmatyar and the Islamists had
tremendous difficulties in gaining support among the Pashtun tribes for they only allowed
their own version of Shari'a, Islamic law, without accommodating the traditional code of
laws. As it will be discussed below, the Taliban on the other hand had greater success in
that they advocated a mixture of Shari 'a and Pashtunwali.38
Despite being the largest and traditionally dominant ethnic group, the Pashtuns
are not one cohesive political force. Like their tribal distinctions, Pashtuns are not
politically homogenous. They enjoy representation across the spectrum of political
groups, from the monarchists and moderates who support the former king, Zahir Shah to
the two extremes of neofundamentalist Taliban and Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami,
advocating Islamic law and the rejection of Afghan traditionalism.
The Tajiks
The Tajiks, the second largest ethnic group concentrated in Kabul and in the north
and northeast, represent a formidable force in the country. However, the Tajik identity is
less concrete than other groups in Afghanistan. According to Brent Glazer, the term
largely refers to Persian-speaking Sunnis that organize "along local lineages, village
clusters, valleys and occupational groups" though "there is no recognisable cultural,
social, or political boundary between them and the others.,,39 A large portion of Tajiks
37 Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (New York: Cambridge University Press 1990) 35
38 I am making this assertion from the basis of Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (New
York: Cambridge University Press 1990) and Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and
Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 2001). Roy has described the
friction between the Islamists and the traditionalists, whereas Rashid has explored how the Taliban
accommodated existing tribal structures. Rashid also asserts that the Taliban's strict punishments that drew
international condemnation are more rooted in Pashtunwali than in Shari'a.
39 Brent Glatzer, "Afghanistan: Ethnic and Tribal Disintegration?" Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan
and the Taliban, William Maley (ed.) (New York: New York University Press 1998) 170
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joined the original Islamist movement at Kabul University. The two most notable Tajik
figures are Jamiat-e Islami leader Burhanuddin Rabbani and his military commander, the
late Ahmed Shah Massoud. Although originally a part of Hekmatyar's group, the Jamiat-
e Islami fractured along ideological and to a lesser extent ethnic lines. Rabbani and his
party moderated their political and religious views and broadened their base to
accommodate other parties, tribes, and ethnic groupS.40 Hekmatyar's extreme dislike for
Rabbani, Massoud, and Jamiat-e Islami stems not from any ethnic hatred but from the
political and military power wielded by the group.
The Uzbeks
Residing exclusively in Northern Afghanistan, the Uzbeks are a small yet
concentrated minority. The Uzbeks settled northern Afghanistan in the late fifteenth
century. Though they employ a tribal and clan structure, it is not as much of an issue
compared to the Pashtuns and their divisions.41 The most visible Uzbek leader, Abdul
Rashid Dostum, has been a major force in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion, in
which he sided with the communists and commanded up to 50,000 Uzbeks. Despite this
alignment, his group, which shrunk to 35,000, would be the arbiter of Afghan politics
prior to US intervention following the terrorist attacks of September 11. Though he
constantly switched sides as determined by the threat, Dostum's support was invaluable
to both the Afghan interim government and those, including Hekmatyar, that were bent
1. . 42ontopplnglt.
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The Hazaras
The Hazaras, representing 10% of the total population, are Imami Shiites and
occupy the highlands in Central Afghanistan.43 Although they also reside in the bigger
cities and parts of the North, it is negligible compared to the central region known as
Hazarajat.44 Despite a universal dislike for Pashtuns since the late nineteenth century
when the Pashtun government began taking Hazarajat farmland, the Hazaras had long
been divided across the political spectrum. Following in fighting, and the emergence of
the Taliban, the Hazaras seemed to have consolidated and rallied in support of the most
powerful, Iran-backed Hezb-e Wahdat. This group entered into several alliances of
convenience with Hekmatyar against the Soviets, Rabbani' s government, and later the
Taliban.45 Cooperation between the two groups extended beyond coordination of separate
offensives but to joint operations against the Soviets, as well as combined offensives
against the Rabbani government and later the Taliban.46
Religion
As one sees across the world, from the Philippines to Afghanistan to Algeria,
Islamic fundamentalism is a potent force capable of harnessing disaffected youths and
disenfranchised individuals and directing them towards militancy and radical thought. As
Martin Marty has expressed, fundamentalism is an effective tactic for the mobilization of
a clear base as it is used "for setting boundaries, for attracting one's kind and alienating
43 The Imami sect is also more widely known as the Twelver Shiites.
44 Brent Glatzer, "Afghanistan: Ethnic and Tribal ... " 171
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other kinds, for demarcating.,,47 Even without taking a detailed look at Afghanistan's
history, one can see that though the Muslim community is divided, elites are still capable
of mobilizing a base of support by invoking the name of Islam.
With a minute percentage of Hindus and Sikhs, Afghanistan is almost completely
Muslim. It is the only commonality among the country's ethnic diversity.48 However,
there is no single and monolithic Islamic base in Afghanistan. Much like its extremely
heterogeneous ethnic composition, Afghanistan's adherents of Islam are divided into a
plethora of groups, which in turn have numerous subdivisions. Scholars such as Olivier
Roy have extensively detailed the nuances and differences. In addition to the Shiite and
Sunni divide, there are splits among the Sunnis.49
Long before the Islamists attacked the government, or the Soviets intervened,
Islam provided Afghan political elites with a potent vehicle for gaining support. In 1891,
Afghanistan's leader Amir Abdurrahman proclaimed a jihad against the British and
Russian neighbors and instituted an oath of loyalty to the Koran. Through these
measures, Abdurrahman "strengthened his own position and legitimacy, not by way of
tribal confirmation as in the case of his predecessors, but by professing his adherence to
Islam and by linking Islam to the independence of Afghanistan.,,5o Secularism,
implemented by King Amanullah in 1924, marginalized the Islamic scholars who had
previously wielded immense power and commanded a substantial base of supporters.51
This wave of secularism and modernization continued through the new monarchy in 1929
47 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "The Fundamentalist Impact in Iran, Pakistan, and the Sudan," Fundamentalisms
and the State, Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.) (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press
1993) 123
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led by Nadir Shah and later Zahir Shah.52 Referred to as the ulama, this community of
Islamic scholars was further undermined by Islamic radicals like Hekmatyar who fused
Islam with politics to mobilize against the monarchy, the leftists, and later the Soviet
Union. By and large, the ulama did not endorse the radicals, as they questioned their lack
of religious education and their similarities with the communists. 53
Islamism distinctly identifies political change as the means to its ends of imposing
shari'a or Islamic law formally establishing the "Islamic Republic." The level of violent
and intensity employed towards this demand, Michael Scott Doran explains, will depend
on the degree of militancy and extremism within the particular Islamist organization. 54 It
is important to underscore the political nature of Islamist actions. As French scholar
Olivier Roy writes,
The Islamists speak of Islamist ideology rather than of religion in the strict
sense of the term. The great challenge that faces them is to create from
Islam a political model capable of competing with the great ideologies of
the Western world. In the forefront of their thinking is the problem of the
state (the "Islamic republic"). They have worked out a theory concerning
the nature of the political party, and their political militancy goes hand-in-
hand with a sense of history. Instead of wishing to manage civil society,
their ambition is to reconstruct society, starting with the state.55
This focus on ideology and politics sets the Islamists apart from the traditional ulama,
concerned with more traditional matters devoid of politics.
The Islamists lack of religious legitimacy vis-a-vis the country's traditional
Islamic scholars severely hampered their ability to expand their base beyond the
52 Willem Vogelsang, The Afghans ...287-292
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universities, and urban population. As it will be explained in chapter 2, the Islamists'
attempts in 1975 to initiate a coup through regional peasant uprisings failed miserably.
However, the 1978 communist coup and the Soviet invasion that followed prompted
sustained uprisings that the younger Islamists were eager to fit in the framework of Islam.
As Olivier explains, Islam became a potent base of support in that it contextualized the
struggle against the communist government and the arriving Soviets. Though the peasant
and tribal revolts were not "directly linked with religion .. .Islam provided the intellectual
framework that allowed the peasants to articulate and legitimize their grievances against
the new regime. ,,56 Even as the facet of young radicals invoking Islam may be a new
phenomenon reflective of foreign influences to be discussed below, the use of Islam as a
political base of support is neither new nor shocking in a Muslim country.
Although much of it overlaps with the fourth support base identified in this
chapter, one must look at the sub-state international Islamist network's effects. While
bolstered at times by state involvement such as Saudi Arabia or the yet virulent states
such as Iran, Libya, Sudan, this transnational phenomenon arose in the mid twentieth
century with the spread of the sub-state Muslim Brotherhood movement. The war against
the Soviet Union brought cooperation between the amorphous Muslim Brotherhood and
Saudi Wahhabi clerics. Instead of backing the traditional Muslim scholars and mullahs,
they exclusively supported the young radicals, especially Hekmatyar by supplying them
with the bulk of funds and the influx of foreign Muslim volunteers.57 Even without
56 Olivier Roy, "Afghanistan: An Islamic War of Resistance," Fundamentalism and the State, Martin E.
Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.) (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 1993) 496
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extensive literature on Hezb-e Islami connections with the international Islamist
movement, there are several. Of all the Afghan resistance groups, Hekmatyar's had the
strongest connection to the influx of Arab money and fighters, primarily Abdullah
Azzam's Peshwar-based aid agency, the precursor to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda.58
Socioeconomic Bases of Support
Afghanistan is primarily an agrarian peasant society. However, the country was a
large recipient of foreign aid even before the Soviet invasion, which decimated much of
Afghan farmland, along with other vital arteries of society.59However, other than timber
and gemstones whose quantity declined as the fighting intensified, Afghanistan's primary
export is narcotics.6o A subset of farmers, the poppy growers represent a budding
economic group, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century. With constant
fighting and sufficient and increasing demand in Pakistan as well as across the world,
opium cultivation "remains crucial for the survival of [Afghanistan's] local peasants.,,61
However, the poppy growers are an interesting political constituency in that all they
desire is the security, protection, and ability to generate sufficient revenue through the
cultivation of opium. As long as they are guaranteed the opportunity to grow and collect
revenue for their crop, they are relatively indifferent to the group that taxes them and
watches over them.62 Though opium taxation and administration remains a common
activity among the regional warlords and mujahadeen, Hekmatyar was the only figure to
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control heroin-processing laboratories located across the border in Pakistan. However,
this would be less of an issue as numerous local laboratories emerged after the Soviet-
backed leader, Mohammed Najibullah's fall 1992.63
The refugees fleeing the Soviet invasion represent a potent group increasing
directly with the hostilities. Coming from across the country, particularly from the
hardest hit provinces, the 3 million refugees that reside in Pakistan would provide an
ample base as the Hezb-e Islami operated from its Peshawar headquarters. With superior
organization and the favor of Pakistan, Hezb-e Islami not only had more tents, rations,
and food to distribute, but also had a role in the administration of the camp, including
education.64 One should not overlook the support that can be generated from providing
goods and services, along with political affiliation, to the numerous disenfranchised
refugees.
Foreign Support
With the majority of Hekmatyar's foreign support coming from Pakistan, one
must explore Pakistan's strategic interests in backing the Hezb-e Islami. As Amin Saikal
explains, Pakistan sought "to enmesh the identity of Pakistan's and Afghanistan's
Pushtuns into one and settle once and for all the longstanding Afghanistan-Pakistan
border dispute in line with Pakistan's interests.,,65 The origins of Pashtun nationalism
date back to British involvement in the nineteenth century. To stabilize their areas of
control following violent uprisings, the British partitioned the Pashtuns along the Durand
Line in 1893 that would later become the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. This division left
63 Geopolitical Drug Watch, The Geopolitics ofDrngs ... 127
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an equal amount of Pashtuns on either side of the border, splitting the ethnic group into
two separated regions.66 The British further divided what would be the Pakistani side into
the NWFP and Balochistan, with the majority of Pashtuns residing in the former of the
two provinces.
Ultimately, the British struck an agreement with the Pakistani Pashtuns that
allowed them to not only maintain autonomy but also their weapons. As a result, newly
formed Pakistan had little means to gain hegemony over NWFP. 67 In essence, the central
Pakistan government had little control over a well-armed and fairly autonomous
population that still harbored nationalist aspirations for a Pashtun homeland. From its
relatively stable years to the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan's leaders consistently sought to
incite the Pashtuns across the border, in part to unbalance their stronger neighbor. Prince
Daud, who would overthrow his cousin, King Zahir Shah in 1973, was extremely
attached to the Pashtunistan cause throughout his tenure in Afghan government, although
in his final years he end his support for the cause. Towards this end, Pakistan sought to
back a friendly Pashtun Islamic group bent on seizing the Afghan government. That
proxy that could bring the fight to the Afghan government, but also maintain ideological
connections with Pakistan that would damper any nationalist desires for a Pashtunistan.
As it will be explained in the next chapter, Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami proved the most
desirable, as it was a disciplined. One can assume that its Leninist characteristics were
advantageous in that the party was not vulnerable to the whims and fancies of a mass
movement, nor would it be accountable strictly to the Pashtuns for the base of support.
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After the Soviets withdrew, and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan neared
collapse, Pakistan broadened its objectives. Establishing an Islamic state would allow
Pakistan to gain "strategic depth" in its conflict with India, as well as open up trade with
new Central Asian republics.68 Towards this end, Pakistan continued to back Hekmatyar
until he proved unable to consolidate territory or seize and hold the government. Instead,
the Pakistani government chose the Taliban, an emerging fundamentalist group in the
Southeastern Afghanistan.69
Afghanistan is certainly a fragmented and fluid political environment. There is
more to Hezb-e Islami than merely its Leninist framework, its Pashtun leader or its
Islamist ideology. Instead one must see how Hekmatyar maneuvers between four
different bases of support, drawing from each when it serves his goal of power. This
ability to manipulate different portions of Afghan society, manifested in his party's
organization, allows his to persist in for over 30 years in arguably the most dangerous
place on earth.
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Chapter Three:
Enter Hekmatyar - The Origins of Hezb-e Islami (1963-1978)
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was born in 1947 to a Ghilzai Pashtun family, which had
traveled from the Pashtun-dominated east to Kunduz province in the north.70 Details of
his childhood and family are scarce, although one might assume. Prior to entering Kabul
University's Engineering College, Hekmatyar had attended two years of military high
school in the capital before dropping out.7!
Hekmatyar's career as an insurgent began at Kabul University in the mid 1960s.
During this time King Zahir Shah instituted a series of democratic reforms, generating a
massive backlash from Islamists and Communists in the form demonstrations, political
violence, and upheaval. Operating largely in the open until the leftist 1973 coup led by
Prince Daud, Kabul University's Muslim Youth Organization, of which Hekmatyar was
an influential member, served as the vanguard for Afghanistan's Islamist movement.
Following the change of government, the Islamists went underground and set up their
base in neighboring Pakistan, where they would continue their struggle for power. This
period is also marked by Islamist infighting that led to the creation of Afghanistan's two
major Islamist parties, Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami and Burhanuddin Rabbani's Jamiat-e
Islami. This chapter will examine the emergence of Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami from
Kabul University's Muslim student organizations and chart its early years as an
opposition party against the both the monarchy, and the leftist government that overthrew
70 Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, AJghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press 2002) 151 and Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy: The Inside Story oJthe CIA's Final
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it. It will also chart the group's exile to Pakistan, the ensuing power struggles and the
events leading to the Soviet invasion.
Even with significant pressures and splits in his organization, Hekmatyar's party
maintained Leninist-style organization and subversive strategies. As the political
environment changes to more open forms of conflict, Hekmatyar cultivates different
bases of support, at first drawing support strictly from university Islamists and then
attempting to branch out as demonstrated in the events leading up to the group's
attempted uprising in 1975. Following the 1973 coup and his flight to Pakistan, he begins
to gamer massive Pakistani material and ideological support. Just prior to the communist
coup in 1978, Hezb-e Islami's future seems dubious. Despite having a well-organized
political party capable of infiltration and subversion, Hekmatyar's religious base fractures
as substantial portion adopt more moderate positions following the 1975 failed coup. The
splits also result in the significant loss of certain Pashtun tribes and locales that had
strongly supported Hekmatyar's cause. While it shows his limitations in gaining
representation, this initial period also demonstrates the diverse bases of support his
Leninist-styled party can draw upon.
University Days (1963-1973)
Afghanistan's Monarchy and Democratic Reforms of J 963
Following the third and final Anglo-Afghan war in 1919, Afghanistan gained its
independence from the British Empire and instituted a constitutional monarchy, which
until 1963 had a rubber-stamp legislature that quickly signed off on the King's
proposals.72 In 1963, King Mohammed Zahir Shah instituted a series of reforms. This
72 Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid (Boulder, CO: Westview
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attempt at democratization resulted from a variety of events. The crown had exhausted
the state's financial resources on a variety of development projects, and had closed the
border with Pakistan over a growing dispute regarding the Pashtuns in the region. The
coups in the Middle East also played a role in the King's desire for reforms.73 Wishing to
further modernize the country, Zahir Shah implemented several risky measures to
liberalize the political system, including a democratically elected parliament, independent
media. However, this influx of openness only strengthened the elements that opposed the
government. Of the 7 independent newspapers founded, 5 were hostile to the central
government. 74
Kabul University - A Hub of Opposition
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's political career started at Kabul University as an
engineering student. Never completing his degree, Hekmatyar spent the majority of his
time on campus involved in the Muslim Youth Party, organizing rallies, recruiting
members, and later subversive acts against the government. 75
From 1965 through the end of Zahir Shah's reign, Kabul University represented a
breeding ground for anti-government organizations.76 However, while Kabul University
served as a vital base for the Communists to organize, demonstrate and recruit, it also
provided extensive opportunities for Afghanistan's Islamists to congregate, and formulate
their opposition to not only the monarchy, but also the communists. It is here that the
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voluntary Muslim Youth Party begins its transformation into a hierarchical Leninist
organization that would later be known as Hezb-e Islami. The efforts of the Kabul
University leftists groups sparked anger among observant Muslims, who then began to
voluntarily congregate and organize. A former member of Kabul University's Muslim
Youth Party elaborates on the formation of the group:
In the beginning, when the demonstrations and meetings of [the Marxist
parties] were first going on, students with Islamic ideas got to know each
other because they would argue with the communist students. Because of
these discussions, the Muslim students came to know which ones had an
Islamic ideology and hated communism and other colonialist activities.77
Although there had been prior Muslim self-identification, Edwards argues that the
Islamist identity had been forged in the university amidst leftist mobilization. This
demographic represents Hezb-e Islami' s initial small base of support.
Though the young Islamists may have banded together due to the large and vocal
communist presence on campus, printed media served a vital role in organizing and
directing the Muslim Youth. Media, as an organizing tool, and central to Leninist
subversive strategy, provides immense explanatory power in understanding the rise of
Hekmatyar in the university and his group's attempts to gamer.78
The Islamist's generation of propaganda underscores its uses as not only a means
to inform, but also to organize and rally around the group identity. In 1972, the
University's Muslim Youth Party sought US assistance, particularly towards acquiring a
printing press to release a newspaper. An appeal by a university Islamist to a State
77 David B. Edwards, "Summoning Muslims ... " 612
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Department officer reveals the group's significant lack of funding.79 While they did not
receive the printing press from the Americans at this time, it is clear they quickly
acquired one due to the volume and professional binding of their pamphlets and
materia1.80 In line with Selznick's assessment of the press and organizing tool, David
Edwards explains the pamphlets offered practical instructions to the Islamists similar to
that of Leninist propaganda. In addition to providing them with broader issues of Islam
that they could relate to and discuss:
The pamphlets also gave Afghan students the tools they needed to
challenge the assertions of leftists who denigrated the role of religion in
the modem world, and they provided the students with the ideological
foundation they needed to assert their own vision of social and political
reform, a vision that was at least as radical in its scope as that being
advanced by the rival Marxist groups at Kabul University.8)
While Hekmatyar and the Islamists indigenously developed a subversive network, they
looked to the Islamist pioneers in Egypt and Pakistan for ideology and direction.
The Islamist Organization
The Afghan Islamists, particularly Hekmatyar, understood early on that their
successes would depend largely in part on political organization. In addition to drawing
from the influences of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, which obsessively focused on
political activism and the party, the Afghan Islamists also were ardent followers of
Maududi, a prominent Islamist from the Indian subcontinent and founder of Pakistan's
Jama'at-e Islami. In a critique of earlier Muslim revivalist movements, Maududi argues
that past failures were a result of no political organization and the rejection of both
79 US Department of State Telegram, "Merajuddin: Portrait of a Moslem Youth Extremist" OS/24/1972
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modernism and its technology.82 Hekmatyar's command of foreign Islamist thought
enhanced his status among the university Islamists, allowing him at first to gain the
respect of and later challenge the older Islamist leaders at Kabul University, notably his
future rival Burhanuddin Rabbani who served in the Theology department. 83
The Group Expands
The Kabul University Islamists had largely confined their activities to campus.
However, starting in 1970, the group began to expand across the country.84 The young
Islamists, with no formal training, began what Olivier Roy describes as "politico-
religious preaching," which was mildly successful in gaining footholds in regions across
the country, although it would ultimately be a failure in preparing for the coup in 1975.85
Along with infiltration and propaganda, the Islamists soon engaged in acts of terror.
Those under Hekmatyar's direction, began attacking emancipated women, who without
their veils provided easily identifiable targets for the groups. In the last few years of the
monarchy, the Islamists threw acid on the faces of women, hospitalizing approximately
200.86
Daud's Coup and the Islamists' Split (1973-1978)
Monarchy Overthrown
Increasing violence in the universities spilled over into the cities. The central
government was unprepared and unresponsive to famine raging across the country.87 On
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July 17, 1973, Prince Daud overthrew the monarch Zahir Shah and quickly granted
government positions to the Kabul University leftists and allied with the communists,
notably the Parcham faction of the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA).88Daud increased the intensity of the crackdown on the Islamists. Realizing their
vulnerability, the Islamist leaders who had escaped earlier detention or had been released
with in the chaos of Daud's coup fled to Pakistan.89 This period between the coup and the
Soviet invasion reveals a tremendous amount of information on Hekmatyar's activities
and strategy. During this period, the Islamists failed in a coup attempt of their own to
overthrow Daud. As a result a split emerged among the group that created two competing
parties, one of which is Hezb-e Islami, lead by Hekmatyar. The other party, Jamiat-e
Islami, lead by the Tajik leader Burhanuddin Rabbani would moderate significantly and
move away from the Islamist camp.
Exile to Pakistan and the Failed Islamist Coup
The failed Islamist coup is a major focal point in the development of Hekmatyar's
Hezb-e Islami. In 1975, the Islamists attempted to overthrow Dawud's regime with a
spontaneous acts of violence across the country, hoping to ignite a revolution. While
fellow leader Rabbani spent the summer in Saudi Arabia, Hekmatyar and the younger,
more radical members commenced a series of simultaneous uprisings, all ending in
failure. Following training by the Pakistani military, in Peshawar, the Islamists crossed
the border and initiated uprisings across the country. While fierce fighting occurred in
certain cities and locations, the areas where Hekmatyar commanded were quiet. It was as
88 William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars 17
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if he had deliberately sat out of the very course of action he had planned for the Afghan
Islamist movement.90
There are several interpretations of the summer uprisings. On one level, the failed
uprising demonstrated the Islamists' shortcomings regarding Leninist subversive strategy.
According to the strategy, propaganda and infiltration set the preparatory conditions that
ensure that later targeted uprisings set off the larger reaction among state institutions such
as the military and the masses. The preparatory work to establish support in key areas had
clearly failed.
The other level of failure was manifested in the disunity of the Islamists.
Hekmatyar's critics within the Islamist camp allege he acted to ensure failure, so that the
other Islamist leaders would be imprisoned allowing him to further strengthen his power
over the movement. 91 This would be a precursor to the intense showdowns between
Hekmatyar and the Tajik leader Rabbani that would occur prior to the Soviet invasion.
The Islamists Split - Organizational Differences
While there is an ethnic component, the Rabbani-Hekmatyar split represents the
deeper ideological and organizational differences between the two leading Afghan
Islamists. One cannot ignore the Islamists ethnic divisions, as Tajik supporters rallied
around Rabbani whereas Hekmatyar garnered the Pashtuns. However, even from the
initial split to the Soviet Invasion, Rabbani's Jamiat-e Islami and Hekmatyar's Hezb-e
Islami co-existed in largely homogenous Tajik or Pashtun areas.92 Rabbani, who would
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abandon the strict Islamist ideology to gamer greater support, understood the necessity of
local legitimacy and support and therefore broke off and formed the Jamiat-e Islami:
Rabbani, after the creation of the Jamiat, spoke in terms of united fronts
and new groups; in particular, he realized that it would be impossible for
them to establish themselves in tribal zones by means of a simple party
structure and that it was necessary to adapt tribal institutions. He
underlined the necessity of accommodating liberal intellectual circles. He
was equally opposed to the elitist views of the Jama'at in Pakistan, which
had absolutely no interest in developing into a mass movement.93
Rabbani's rejection of the Leninist party structure and organization reflects a moderation
of his political and religious views, brought about perhaps by the drastic failure of the
1975 uprisings. Although Leninist parties enter united fronts, they do so only to balance a
common threat and maintain acts of subversion against their alliance partners, as will be
displayed in Hekmatyar manipulation of his allies during the Soviet invasion and the
ensuing civil war.
A Second Split - Hekmatyar Hemorrhages Support
Hezb-e Islami suffered a second split in 1978 that resulted in the loss of
significant ethno-regional backing. Younis Khalis, a religious leader of the Pashtun
Nangrahar tribe broke with Hekmatyar, preferring a more accomodationist and inclusive
interpretation of Islam. Khalis' vision of Islam mirrored that of Tajik leader Rabbani,
which would undercut Hekmatyar's later attempts to woo moderate Pashtuns.94 However,
the split goes beyond just the interpretation of Islam, to include the divisions between the
younger Islamists and the more traditional elements of the Afghan Muslim community,
notably the scholars. Khalis viewed Hekmatyar and the other younger radicals as
"schoolboys," in that they lacked religious education offered at the religious schools
93 Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance 1986
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known as madrasas, and instead supplemented their theological deficiencies with
political extremism found in the secular universities that conflicted with traditional
Afghan values.9s
Although the departure of notable and respectable leaders Rabbani and Khalis
may have significantly loosened Hezb-e Islami's control of the Islamist base and cost it
significant regional support, it seems to have had a centralizing effect on the group. With
the departure of the more moderate elements, only the radical and devoted adherents to
Hekmatyar and Islamism remained. These hardcore elements of Hezb-e Islami would
remain with Hekmatyar to the present, serving as aids, deputies, and top commanders.96
Wooing Pakistan
After losing the moderate Islamists and the Pashtun tribes under Khales,
Hekmatyar landed significant Pakistani support. This initial rebound underscores his
abilities to draw from multiple avenues of support. Hekmatyar's radical Hezb-e Islami
appealed to core Pakistani power circles: Prime Minister Bhutto's central government,
the military, and the Pakistani Islamist Jama'at-e Islami (not to be confused with the
Rabbani's Tajik Jamiat-e Islami in Afghanistan).97 Hekmatyar garnered the most support
from these groups as it not only opposed the Pashtunistan nationalism coming from
Kabul, but also was more ideologically and organizationally in line with Pakistan's
Jama'at-e Islami Islamist party that began to grow in popularity and stature.98
Furthermore, as it did not seek to accommodate other Afghan groups or transform into a
95 David Edwards, Before Taliban ... 247-250 The group ofIslamic scholars is often referred to as the
ulama. A pervasive critique of Islamist movements across the Arab and Muslim world identifies the
Islamists lack of connection with the ulama.
96 David Edwards, Before Taliban ... , "Hundreds arrested over fear of coup in Kabul," The Guardian, April
5,2002
97 Marvin G. Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstmction (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press 1994) 6
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mass-movement, Hezb-e Islami offered Pakistan's civilian and military leaders a more
reliable proxy than Rabbani's group.
In 1977, Daud called for a traditional Afghan meeting of political leaders, known
as a Laya Jirga, in which the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan were
banned from attending.99 This would set the stage for a showdown between Daud and the
Communists that would initiate a series of events including increased subversive acts by
Hekmatyar, a communist coup, and culminate with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Moscow's intervention saved Hekmatyar in that it exponentially increased his foreign
support, legitimated his holy war among a larger religious base, and allowed him to take
advantage of the growing humanitarian crisis to cultivate a growing socioeconomic class
in Pakistan's teeming refugee camps.
98 Bennet Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 2002) 30
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Chapter Four:
The Bear Intervenes (1978-1989)
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a fascinating section of later Cold War
history. Rather than provide a comprehensive account of the war, this chapter will
instead focus on Hekmatyar's actions to gamer foreign support pouring into the country,
and his attempts to cultivate regional, socioeconomic support against the backdrop of the
war. During this period, Hekmatyar relied extensively on his base in Peshawar, Pakistan
to direct the war. Though the previous chapter described the split and disunity among the
Afghan Islamists, the Hezb-e Islami effectively applied the Leninist style of alliance
making to expand its operations and bases of support. During the Soviet invasion,
Hekmatyar employed a Leninist organization and massive outside support to supplement
as well as expand his relatively low levels of support from regional, socioeconomic
bases.
The Communist Coup
Although he had initially supported the communists, who had operated out of
Kabul University, Daud soon initiated a crackdown on his former allies, particularly the
Marxist Khalq and Parcham political factions that split and later reconstituted the
People's Democratic Part of Afghanistan (PDPA).100 This would set the stage for a
communist coup perpetrated by elements of the PDPA. Following the breakdown and in-
fighting of the PDPA, the Soviets decided to intervene with a large military force.
Hekmatyar's Provocation
Before the communist coup and Soviet invasion, Hezb-e Islami stepped up its
subversive actions against Daud's government by increasing assassinations and acts of
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violence against high profile government targets. The most notable and provocative act
initiated by Hekmatyar had drastic effects on the Afghan government, provoking drastic
responses from the communist elements of the country. Following the assassination of a
prominent Marxist in April 1978, the PDP A, having themselves infiltrated the upper
echelons of the Afghan military, overthrew Daud. The following year leading up to the
Soviet invasion was characterized by intense internal power struggles among the Afghan
communist elite and instability.
The Soviets Invade
In September 1979, Prime Minister Hafiz Allah Amin seized power from Ghalji
Tarakki. The Islamic revolution in neighboring Iran coupled with Amin's desires to
distance Afghanistan from the Soviet Union prompted the communist superpower to
invade and reestablish the country's Marxist leadership. By December 27, 1979 the
Soviets had taken Kabul, killed Amin, and began to restructure the PDP A.lOt
The Soviet strategy in Afghanistan, while evolving over the course of different
leaders in Moscow, consistently incorporated massive amounts of ground troops armed
with overwhelming firepower. By 1983, Moscow had deployed to Afghanistan 110,000
troops from the Soviet 40th Army along with advisors. In addition, three more army
divisions mounted cross border operations from Soviet territory.t02
100 Willem Vogelsang, The Afghans (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers 2002) 301
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Hekmatyar's Strategy
Manipulating the Allies
Hekmatyar's exploitation of other resistance groups eager to fonn alliances
underscores his Leninist strategy of maximizing his personal and party gains at the
expense of prosecuting a unified war against the Soviets. From the beginning of the
Russian invasion there was a general consensus among the diverse collection of Afghan
leaders that a broad alliance was needed to direct resistance to the Russian invaders. The
communist government and the arrival of the Soviet Union threatened local customs and
traditions across the board, endangering the different and often opposed ethnic groups.
While only Hekmatyar and the other Islamists had a cohesive, although no less
oppreSSIve, vision for a post-Soviet Afghanistan, the longstanding "tradition of
opposition" In the country rallied groups of all denominations to oppose the
communists. 103
As early as March 1980, as many as five Afghan opposition groups fonned an
alliance against the Soviets. The alliance consisted of both moderate traditionalists and
the Peshawar-based Islamists, notably the Hezb-e Islami splinter group lead by Younis
Khalis and Rabbani's Jamiat-e Islami, which had also split from Hekmatyar as explained
in the previous chapter.104 Hekmatyar vehemently opposed the alliance as it would
undercut his own authority as well as level the playing field by developing the other less
politically astute Afghan figures into party leaders.
In May 1985, Hekmatyar finally agreed to the broad-based alliance extracting
concessions from other groups eager to accommodate in hopes of a broad-based front
103 Central Intelligence Agency, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Five Years After, Declassified 1999
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against the Soviets. The seven Peshawar-based groups, which represented not only the
majority of Afghan opposition but also a broad spectrum of the country's political and
ethnic groups fonn the alliance known as the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahadin.105
From the outcome, one can see how Hekmatyar withheld his support until he could
achieve the maximum gains for Hezb-e Islami. In October, as Hekmatyar, who had
assumed the rotating presidency, used the forum to slander his rivals and insult President
Reagan by refusing to meet with him, snubbing the very superpower that gave the
Afghan resistance the tools and training to drive out the Soviets.I06.
Regional Expansion
Before the Soviet Invasion, Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami represented the only
coherent and organized Afghan opposition party. Unlike other the other Afghan
opposition leaders, Hekmatyar viewed resistance against the Soviets as a minor priority
compared to dominating other Afghan parties and organizations. Although his party was
involved in some of the fighting, its focus on achieving military gains against the Soviets
was minimal. Instead, Hekmatyar and his cadre kept their focus on seizing power for
themselves.107 Following the arrival of Soviet forces, Hekmatyar immediately attempted
to subordinate rather than cooperate with other resistance groups, including Rabbani' s
organization. Olivier Roy explains the group's attempts to expand its base of support:
Its commandos were the first to leave their own territory to impose party
authority on neighboring territories. The Hizb disanned the other parties
and would not tolerate their presence in its own territory. Its first goal was
to control the civilian population, and being well organised it succeeded in
\04 US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "The Afghan Resistance Movement in
1981: Progress, but a Long Way to Go," Report, January 19, 1982 (declassification date unknown).
IOS Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press 2002) 238
106 need citation
107 Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance ... 133-135
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setting up a solid and diversified administration. The traditional influential
families were brushed aside and even the [traditional religious judges]
were only allowed to exert their influence within the framework of the
party. The party was very highly centralized and homogenous. The elite
members were visionaries, dogmatic, and living their whole life for the
party and devoted to Hekmatyar; they were thus more detached from the
group solidarity of the [local communities] than was the case in the other
groups. 108
The Hezb-e expansion reflects the Leninist characteristics of strict hierarchical control,
party discipline, and ideological purity relevant to the combat party. However, these
actions also reveal a desire to expand the group's regional support.
Waving Islam's Banner
As mentioned above, Hekmatyar had lost significant credibility among both
moderate elements of the Islamist movement and the traditional Afghan Islamic
community, resulting in the fracture of his group. However, after the Soviets arrived, the
younger Islamist radicals gained stature domestically as well as internationally.
Following Moscow's intervention, the country's Islamic scholars, a traditional facet of
Afghan society, were further alienated as they could not respond with a consistent
political program.109 The Islamists filled that vacuum, offering a political strategy to
accompany their religious goals of instituting Islamic law.
The Saudis and the amorphous Muslim Brotherhood organization vigorously
attempted to restore Hekmatyar to the forefront of the Afghan Islamist movement. 110 By
1984, Arab volunteers began arriving in mass in conjunction with the immense Saudi aid
earmarked for supporting the radical Islamists and spreading Wahhabism. This included
lOll Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance ... 133
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building madrasas to be established in Pakistan for the Afghan mullahs. III Hekmatyar
and another Islamist leader, Sayyaf, not only garnered the majority of the funding but
also anywhere from 6,000 to 20,000 Arab volunteers to fight the Soviets. I12The money
from the gulf also allowed Hekmatyar to recruit from poor regions and from refugees
settled in Peshawar, Pakistan:13 With the ideological support and funding of the Saudis
and Muslim Brotherhood, Hekmatyar would, as the Soviets contemplated withdrawal,
establish training camps that served not only those fighting the Russians, but also
Philippine, Kashmiri, and Palestinian Islamic militants.114 These camps would be the
prototype for those that Osama bin Laden would establish under Taliban protection.
Hekmatyar even captured support from the radical Khomeini government in Iran,
winning early support for specific regional operations outside the scope of Iran's normal
Hazara proxies. A DIA background paper indicates substantial material support,
particularly to Hekmatyar. Along with uniforms, boots, and small arms, Iran provided
man-portable shoulder-fired antitank rockets and heavy machine guns to Hekmatyar
specifically "for operations in southern and eastern Afghanistan.,,11s
The Pinnacle of Foreign Support - Hezb-e Islami's Peshawar HQ
Pakistan's border provinces, proving to be a vital center of gravity for the Afghan
resistance, allowed Hekmatyar to fuse his bases of support and establish an effective
network to conduct his insurgency. By 1985, approximately three million Afghans had
III Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance ...218
112 Marvin Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstroction (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press 1994) 35-36. The range is so large because Pakistan did not keep any records
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47
settled in Pakistan's 300 refugees camps.116 As resistance to the Soviets emerged,
Hekmatyar's headquarters in Peshawar maximized the group's efficacy in infiltration and
propaganda, particularly against other opposition parties. The group's actions in
Peshawar also reveal the extent of Pakistani support that facilitated the group's
subversive activities.
Cultivating the Socioeconomic Base of Support
While it may not amount to a substantial support base, the Afghan refugees in
Pakistan contributed to Hezb-e Islami's socioeconomic constituency. On one level, the
swelling of refugee support for Hekmatyar reflects opportunism. As the best-funded,
most organized group controlling the refugee camps, Hezb-e Islami appealed to refugees.
Kristian Berg Harpviken has explained that refugee status could only be obtained if one
claimed membership in a "resistance party." I I?
Much is made of Afghanistan's opium fields a key source of insurgency,
particularly for the well-networked and externally funded Hezb-e Islami. As covert
funding from the West and Middle East poured in through Pakistan's Inter-service
Intelligence (ISI) to the Afghan clients, the Afghan resistance began to seize key
agricultural locations. According to Alfred McCoy, the opposition groups convinced
farmers to plant more opium and the country's output of the crop doubled to 575 tons.118
However, this jump is relatively minor as to the exponential growth that occurred
following the Soviet withdrawal. When the Soviets prepared to withdraw in the late
116 Richard P. Cronin, Afghanistan After Five Years: Status of the Conflict, the Afghan Resistance, and the
u.s. Role, Congressional Research Service, January 1985
117 Kristian Berg Harpviken, "Transcending Traditionalism: The Emergence of Non-State Military
Formations in Afghanistan," Journal of Peace Research, v.34, i.3 (August 1997) 277
Ill! Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade (Chicago, IL:
Lawrence Hill 1991) 453-4
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1980s, Western funding for the Afghan resistance began to decline. To supplement the
income, Afghan leaders turned to opium and heroin dealing.
Hekmatyar's involvement in the drug trade goes beyond simply opIUm
cultivation, the staple of regional warlords controlling the drug fields. With Hekmatyar's
ISI connections, he profited from controlling the supply routes used by CIA and ISI
teams providing weapons. With substantial help from the ISI, he established opium
processing and refinement laboratories just across the border in Pakistan to produce and
export heroin. Hekmatyar only began to challenge regional warlords for the opium fields
as other sources of support declined.119
Subversive Activities
At this time, Pakistan's accommodation of Hezb-e Islami is of critical importance.
Hekmatyar's group was not only permitted but also aided by government authorities in
activities restricted to the general Pakistani public. Unlike Pakistan's own political
opposition parties, the Hezb-e Islami could freely assemble, publish and distribute their
propaganda, as well as organize and coordinate their operations in neighboring
Afghanistan. 120
However, the most striking element of the Hezb-e Islami in Pakistan is their
security apparatus. Even beyond the refugee camps, the party maintained security forces
ostensibly to monitor communists and infiltrators. However, in reality they targeted other
Afghan Islamist and resistance groups and coordinated their actions extensively with
119 Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics ofHeroin ...Despite McCoy's sensationalist and polemical rant against
the CIA, he provides a very interesting snapshot of Hekmatyar's war against local warlord Mullah Nasim
Akhundzada. Hekmatyar only challenges Nasim, controller of the opium-rich Helmand Valley, when the
price of opium rises. High prices in opium complicated Hekmatyar's abilities to cheaply produce heroin
from the poppy.
120 Marvin G. Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconst11lction Boulder, CO:
Westview 1994) 81-2
49
Pakistani law enforcement. Hezb-e Islami coordinated significantly outside the refugee
camps
Beginning early in the war, Afghans arrested by Pakistan's law-
enforcement agencies were often interrogated in the presence of Hezb-i-
Islami security personnel. Hekmatyar's followers were also widely
believed to maintain their own jails, incarcerating and badly treating not
only suspected communists but followers of other parties.121
Hekmatyar exploited this cooperation to the fullest. In February, 1988 Hezb-e Islami
assassins, allegedly with substantial support from Pakistani law enforcement, murdered
an influential Afghan professor and supporter of the former monarch Zahir Shah. The
professor, Sayd Majrooh, had been formulating a political compromise among the
different Afghan groups that involved the return of Zahir Shah. Pakistani authorities
tacitly aided in the assassination, which had a devastating effect on the secular royalist
Afghans, essentially moderate Pashtuns that opposed Hekmatyar's radicalism. 122
The Bombing of the Interior Ministry - A Case Study in Leninist Subversion
Even though the group's Headquarters remained based across the border, it still
retained the characteristic absolute, centralized leadership of a Leninist party. Its
maintenance and direction over individual cells demonstrates its continued control over
the entire organization. For example, in May 1983, a Kabul-based cell planned to bomb
the Afghan Ministry of Interior with the goal of assassinating the minister while
maximizing other casualties. The cell recruited and trained a gardener at the building, and
provided him with four explosive devices with timers hidden in large flowerpots. The
121 Marvin Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan ... 82
122 Barney Rubin, "Policies of the Pakistani Military toward the Afghan Resistance: Human Rights
Implications," Asia Watch February 27, 1989
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Hezb-e Islami asset then smuggled in the bombs and planted them around the Interior
Minister's office. 123
The cell planned to detonate the explosives during the daytime while the building
was full and the minister present, however the Hezb-e leadership in Pakistan overrode the
cell leader and demanded the minister be spared and the bombing occur at night.
Hekmatyar and his lieutenants prioritized politics over a possible tactical blow against the
Soviet-backed government. The cell leader, Haji Mohammad Yakub explains that the
Hezb-e leadership "wanted to keep Minister of the Interior Galub Zoy alive since he was
a leader member of the Khalq faction and his survival would insure that the friction
between the Khalq and Parchim communist party factions continued." With a hint of
frustration he adds: "If we had set off the bombs during the day, we would have killed
Galub Zoy [the Interior Minister], Ghazi (his body guard), Sheruddin (his aide-de-camp)
and perhaps a hundred others.,,124 Hekmatyar's calculations placed politics, notably
internal divisions to be manipulated, above the operational goal of imposing significant
costs on Soviet and Soviet-backed forces. It also displays the centralization and
hierarchical control extended to the very cell involved in fighting.
US Support
Though being the United States' most vocal critic, Hekmatyar received the largest
share of the superpower's funding. During its time, US involvement in Afghanistan
represented the most expensive covert operation in history, costing approximately 2.5
123 Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the
Soviet-Afghan War, (Quantico, VA: United States Marine Corps Studies and Analysis Division 1995) 369
124 Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the MOllntain ...369
51
billion dollars.125 Despite the hollow claims and polemics of conspiracy theorists, the
CIA had little operational control over the massive monetary dispersal. 126Instead, "to
avoid offending the sensibilities of [Pakistan]" a selection of its own generals managed
the funds, which resulted in "poor accounting and no accountability for the aid, almost an
invitation to graft.,,127Fully in control of the funds, Pakistan dispersed 75 percent of the
funds to the four main Islamist parties, with Hekmatyar's group alone taking 25 percent
of the total. I28
Any belief that the US intentionally favored Hekmatyar should be dispelled by the
tremendous problems that the US, and specifically the CIA, had in dealing with the Hezb-
e Islami leader. After assuming the rotating presidency of the Afghan alliance in October
1985, Hekmatyar snubbed President Reagan by refusing to meet with him. After being
misled by Pakistani ISI Generals into backing Hekmatyar, US officials would have
tremendous problems working with Hekmatyar. Meetings between CIA case officers and
the Hezb-e Islami leader were cold at best, in which the latter insulted the former, and
often accused him and his agency of plotting to kill him.129While Hekmatyar would
accept every iota of aid coming ultimately from the US, he maintained his virulent
125 John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations From World War II
Through the Persian Gulf363
126 Polemical claims include Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics oj Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug
Trade (Chicago, IL: Lawrence Hill 1991), Bob Woodward, VEIL: The Secret Wars oJthe CIA (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1987) This source includes a fabrication of an interview with William Casey. Casey,
who would die as a result of a brain tumor, was incomprehensible at a time Woodward claimed to have
interviewed him.
127 John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars ... 363 With hindsight, the decision seems obviously ridiculous to
leave the discretion of fund allocation to ISI Generals under Zia. However, given that the US wanted no
visible footprint for the Soviets to see, it seems to be an understandable and cautious decision given the
historical context.
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rhetoric perhaps to maintain his position in the fundamentalist Islamist movement, and
please his contemporaries in the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly the types that would
form al Qaeda.
Stingers and Sweet Talk
As the war dragged on, it was clear that Soviet air assets, notably the MI-24
helicopter gunship, could wreak havoc on the Afghan resistance with relative
impunity.130The Stinger missile's arrival in Afghanistan is a complex story in itself, in
which Afghan war proponents in Congress campaigned against the wishes of the cautious
CIA, eager to avoid the controversies, and commissions of the previous decade.131 Along
with its counterparts at Langley, the Pentagon feared that supplying the rebels with
Stingers might provoke massive Soviet military action directed at Pakistan. 132Needless to
say, there was tremendous opposition to supplying the rebels with Stinger missiles. Until
the first of the advanced anti-air missiles arrived in Afghanistan in September 1986, the
US supplied the rebels with other less mobile weaponry, such as the Swiss Oerlikon
cannon. Despite differences in numerical results, it is clear the Stinger missile had a
decisive impact on the war. From its introduction to the Soviet withdrawal, the advanced
anti-air missile accounted for the downing of over 250 Soviet and DRA aircraft. Though
130 By the early 80s, the Afghans possessed Soviet SA-7 man portable SAMs, and had brought down Soviet
and DRA aircraft.
131 Alan J. Kuperman, "The Stinger Missile and U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan," Political Science
Quarterly, vl12 n2 (1999) 222 For more see George Crile, Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story
of the Largest Covert Operation in History (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press 2003) and Milt Bearden
and James Risen, The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB (New
York: Random House 2003) Crile and Bearden offer two separate yet overlapping accounts of the stinger
episode. Crile covers Congressman Charlie Wilson's story, whereas Bearden provides his experiences as
the chief CIA officer in Pakistan coordinating the US covert aid program.
132 Alan Kuperman, "The Stinger Missile ... " 223 Kuperman interviewed Fred Ikle, Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy who headed the Pentagon's covert programs during Soviet invasion. Ikle asserted that at
the time, there was genuine fear that "one million Soviet troops" would invade Pakistan.
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having a minimal impact on the ground, Hekmatyar's forces were eager to shoot down
planes and hoard the remaining weapons for themselves. 133
Towards the end of acquiring advanced weaponry, Hekmatyar knew which
Americans to charm. Unlike the cold meetings with the CIA where he insulted and
harassed case officers, Hekmatyar was open and receptive when meeting with members
of Congress, specifically Charlie Wilson. During a meeting in March 1987 with Milt
Bearden, the CIA's top official in Pakistan, Hekmatyar scoffed at American support,
proclaiming that he had no need for American-supplied Stingers: "I don't need support
from you or your Congress. I can capture enough weapons from the enemy to fight the
jihad.,,134 However, in his meetings with Congressman Wilson, Hekmatyar actively
sought to acquire more weapons from his willing patrons, even accepting weapons "the
little Satan" Israel had captured from the PLO. 135As Stingers arrived, Hekmatyar's group
procured the lion's share from the middlemen in Pakistan's ISI.
Hekmatyar's strategy during the Soviet Invasion demonstrates his exceptional
abilities to persist in such a dangerous and fluid political environment. During this period,
Pakistan's support proved vital to Hekmatyar's designs in that it allowed him unfettered
access in the Peshawar refugee camps which resulted in the substantial broadening of his
support to include the numerous refugees fleeing the war. Pakistani favoritism allowed
Hezb-e Islami to gamer the majority of US funding and weaponry which would no doubt
be used against Hekmatyar's rivals once the Soviets withdrew.
133 Alan Kupennan, "The Stinger Missile" ... 246 Kupennan lists a variety of studies with different results
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MI-24 Hinds. A stinger team lead by Hezb-e Islami member Engineer Ghaffar was trained by Bearden
134 Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy ... 282
135 George Crile, Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story oJthe Largest Covert Operation in
History (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press 2003) 223-4
54
Chapter Five:
Afghanistan in a Post-Cold War World
The period following the Soviet withdrawal to the present underscores the fluid Afghan
political environment where power shifts quickly, and alliances are defined by threats.
Though Hekmatyar was appointed as the country's Prime Minister and persists following
his ouster, he lost considerable support as the Taliban movement emerged in 1994. This
chapter tells the story of Hekmatyar's fall from power and his current involvement with
al Qaeda and Taliban remnants.
Najibullah's Rise and Fall (1989-1992)
Although the last of the Soviets withdrew in 1989, the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan (DRA) lasted until April, 1992. As the Soviets prepared to leave,
Mohammed Najibullah replaced Barbak Kamal in 1986 as the head of the DRA.
Najibullah, formerly in charge of the communist state's intelligence service Khad,
allegedly ordered the execution of over 80,000 people as well as masterminded a series of
attacks across the border in Pakistan, which had killed hundreds.136 Shortly after
Najibullah assumed power, Hekmatyar's group further infiltrated the regime, and won a
sizable portion of the most hard-line communists of the regime. While an alliance with
hard-line communists may seem questionable, it should now be no surprise that a
Leninist-styled group would enter into seemingly a peculiar alliance:
Aside from their common desire to oust the Najibullah government, the
Khalqis and Hezb-i-Islami leaders appeared to share a similar fate in their
almost certainly being left out of any internationally sponsored political
compromise that would favor more moderate elements. For Pakistan's
military and civilian authorities, the coup offered a possible chance to
136 Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan (Sterling, VA: Pluto
Press 200 1) I
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short circuit the war. It was a return to a military solution made attractive
by the lack of progress in finding a negotiated political settlement. 137
The coup attempt ultimately failed, as Najibullah survived Khalqi air strike and the
fighting was largely contained.138 However, Hekmatyar would rebound, attempting two
years later with better results.
Najibullah's Fall - Hekmatyar Plays the Ethnic Card
Through cooperation with the remnants of the DRA's interior ministry,
Hekmatyar attempted another coup as the Najibullah regime began to crumble. After a
small force of Uzbek troops led by former Communist ally Rashid Dostum turned on
Najibullah and prepared to enter Kabul, and following a dissention within the DRA
government, the Soviet-backed leader sought refuge in the UN compound.139 With the
regime collapsing, Hekmatyar attempted to capitalize on the political chaos. On April 25,
1992 Hekmatyar proclaimed control of the city, ignored the other opposition members
and threatened to shoot their plane down if they attempted to land at the airport.14oOn the
same day, Mojaddedi, who had been selected as the Afghan Interim Government
President, appointed Ahmed Shah Massoud as the Afghan Defense Minister and tasked
him to clear the city of Hezb-e Islami forces. Leading a coalition of the Tajiks, Uzbeks,
and Hazara factions, Massoud successfully drove Hekmatyar's forces from the city.141
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The military action represented a significant milestone, as it was the first time in Afghan
history that Tajiks and Uzbeks had ever controlled Kabul. 142
Hekmatyar attempted to exploit this fact by to appealing to a larger segment of the
Pashtun population for support.143 However, the moderate Pashtuns, which Hekmatyar
would further alienate with daily rocket and artillery barrages, preferred the moderate
Tajiks such as Rabbani and Massoud. The Tajik archenemies of Hekmatyar had not only
joined with moderate Pashtun parties but also provided "conciliatory gestures" to counter
Hezb-e Islami attempts to foment an ethnic conflict as the Najibullah regime
evaporated.l44 This does not mean Hekmatyar's manipulation of ethnic divisions did not
bear fruit. Even though moderate Pashtuns in the Kabul area did not openly oppose the
Tajiks, Hezb-e Islami efforts produced a "studied neutrality" among Pashtuns fearing
minority dominance and second-class status.145 However, Hekmatyar would further
complicate his own efforts to win over a larger Pashtun base of support by allying with
Uzbek warlord Rashid Dostum.
He Who Would Shell His Own Capital (1992-1994)
The Afghan Interim Government
There were many attempts both during and after to the Soviet invasion to produce
a viable Afghan Interim Government. While chronicling the many attempts would be
both confusing and frustrating, one must understand some of the key arrangements and
agreements which lead to Hekmatyar's ascension to the country's Prime Minister. The
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Peshawar accords of 1992 granted the presidency to Mojaddedi, a traditionalist and
moderate. 146 Following his two-month term, the title would be handed over to Rabbani.
Hekmatyar's group would receive the Prime Ministership, while Rabbani's Jamiat-e
Islami would take the Defense Ministry. A council would then form to organize elections
18 months later. Wanting more for himself and his party, Hekmatyar denounced the
interim government as "communist" and refused the post. In reality, the Hezb-e Islami
leader wanted at the least more influence and at the most control of Kabul. 147
Following his rival Rabbani's ascension to the Presidency in August 1992,
Hekmatyar began the artillery barrage of Kabul, which will be explained further below.
With Pakistani pressure on Rabbani mounting, the Kabul government capitulated, signing
the Islamabad accords with Hekmatyar in March 1993. As a result, the Defense and
Interior Ministries were put under "collegial control" which would allow for Hezb-e
Islami participation, if not outright subversion and infiltration.148
The Shelling of Kabul
In August 1992, Hezb-e Islami forces positioned outside Kabul commenced the
sustained artillery and rocket barrage of the capital, that would claim approximately
anywhere between 10,000 to 25000 lives.149 As Afghan experts generally conclude, it's
doubtful that Hekmatyar could forcibly topple the Afghan government. Instead, the
Hezb-e Islami shelling of Kabul should be regarded as a coercive effort to undermine the
146 Shah M. Tarzi, "Afghanistan in 1992" .
147 William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars 197-202
148 William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars 197-202
149 William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars 204-5. Figures on the death toll from the shelling of Kabul
vary significantly. The Afghan Red Crescent Society attributed 10,000 deaths to 1993 alone. In a 1995
report, Amnesty International reports a figure of 25,000 dead.
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interim government and extract concessions. 150 Hekmatyar assumed the daily massive
artillery and rocket barrages would undermine the current administration; however, he
underestimated the attacks' effects on his basis of support. To supplement his
unpopularity with moderate Pashtuns, Hekmatyar allied with one of his fiercest
opponents, Abdul Rashid Dostum, the Uzbek leader who fought on the side of the
communists.
The Taliban - The New Kids on the Block Emerge (1994-2001) .
While Hekmatyar preoccupied himself with shelling Kabul and combating the
Afghan government, the Taliban emerged in southern Afghanistan and over the course of
two years consolidated its control. By the end of the 1996, the militia seized Kabul.
Along with providing some historical details, this section will examine how the Taliban
drew from Hekmatyar's bases of support, leaving the Hezb-e Islami leader to briefly
reconcile with his former foes before fleeing to Iran.
Pakistan and the Taliban's Southern Sweep
With Hekmatyar concerned with gaining more personal power by shelling Kabul,
Pakistan searched for a better proxy. By 1994, Hekmatyar had done little but kill
thousands of civilians, while he lost territory to Rabbani' s forces commanded by Ahmed
Shah Massoud.151 With the majority of Pashtuns loathing Hekmatyar, Pakistan sought a
more effective Pashtun group that could consolidate territory and ensure safe transit
routes ultimately opening up trade routes into Central Asia.152 It had to look no further
150150 Shah M. Tarzi, "Afghanistan in 1992" ... 170
151 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban 26
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than its own tribal prOVInces bordering Afghanistan, where Saudi-funded madrasas
instructed young Afghans and Pakistanis in the ways of Islamic fundamentalism.
To strengthen their newfound proxy and tie up loose ends, Pakistani Inter Service
Intelligence (ISI) directed them against Hekmatyar's weak spots along the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border. In early October, 1994 ISI provided intelligence and support to the
200 Taliban fighters that raided Hekmatyar's strategically vital post and refueling spot at
Spin Baldak. The Taliban went on to raid the post's anns depot, securing 18,000
Kalashnikov rifles, "dozens of artillery pieces, large quantities of ammunition and many
vehicles.,,153
Following their takeover of Hezb-e Islami anns depot, the group moved towards
the southern cities. In the following month, the Taliban captured Kandahar without a shot
fired and gained control of more military hardware, namely tanks, helicopters and six
Mig-21 fighters left from the Soviets.154Four months after the group raided Hekmatyar's
key anns depot, the Taliban grew to roughly 20-25,000 men, 200 tanks, numerous
artillery pieces, as well as Soviet-made helicopters and MiG jetfighters.155 Between
November 1994 and February of the next year, the Taliban advanced virtually unopposed
through the southern half of Afghanistan. By early February 1995, the Taliban advanced
on the outskirts of Kabul forcing Hekmatyar to flee his Charasiab headquarters, the
strategic position from which artillery struck the capita1.156
153 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban 27-8
154 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban 29
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Hekmatyar's Grip on a Religious Base Slips
While Hekmatyar's command of a religious base of support was always tenuous
and difficult to evaluate, it is clear that the emergence of the Taliban drastically
challenged his position as the leading proponent of instituting Islamic law. Hekmatyar's
anti-traditionalist bent, no doubt influenced by Leninism and Middle East Islamism,
alienated Pashtun tribes content in maintaining their local traditions and code of laws.
Where Hekmatyar failed, the Taliban succeeded, in that they simultaneously garnered a
religious and tribal base by fusing Islamic law with traditional Pashtun customs.157
Hekmatyar deliberately and forcefully removed the local mullahs, Islamic scholars, and
tribal elders from the decision-making process after Hezb-e Islami established itself in a
rural area; whereas, the Taliban integrated these forces into its power base.
Although different in organization style and particular interpretation of Islamic
fundamentalism, the Taliban movement has many similarities with Hekmatyar's handful
of ill-equipped religious students, which quickly spread across the southern portion of the
country and began its conquest of Afghanistan. Like Hekmatyar's group, Pakistani
funding and the taxation of opium cultivation greatly enhanced the Taliban's ability to
challenge other actors. However, where Hekmatyar failed in getting an ethno-regional
base, the Taliban initially succeeded. Its unique ability to co-opt initial support in the
south demonstrates the importance of an ethno-regional base of support.
The Taliban Approaches Kabul - An Alliance Too Late
As the Taliban approached Kabul and commenced their own indiscriminate
shelling of the capital, the central governrt1ent composed of a newly fonned coalition of
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Tajiks, Uzbeks, and moderate Pashtuns rallied under the seasoned commander, Ahmed
Shah Massoud. In an attempt to create a larger base of support and win over a greater
amount of Pashtuns, the alliance extended its membership to Hekmatyar, who had been
routed south of Kabul by Pakistan's new proxy. Rabbani and Massoud believed that
following the Taliban's victories over the Hezb-e Islami, Hekmatyar would be too weak
to demand more power from the central government as he had done while shelling
Kabul. 158 After having lost so much territory and support from the southern Pashtuns,
Hekmatyar joined the central government in May, returning to his post as Prime Minister.
Upon arriving in Kabul, Hekmatyar began imposing Shari'a, in a bid to reestablish
himself as the country's foremost Islamic figure. 159
Rabbani and Massoud had calculated correctly that Hekmatyar was in no position
to deliberately undermine the central government. However following the May 1995
alliance, his weakness forced the central government to stretch its forces too thin to cover
the Hezb-e Islami' s poorly-defended bases.160 This would set the stage for the Taliban' s
September 1995 victory at Kabul and Hekmatyar's flight to Tehran.
Exile to Iran
Though the regime in Tehran sheltered Hekmatyar, the degree of support they
provided him during this period is unclear. Furthermore, the extent of Hezb-e Islami's
operations inside Afghanistan and Peshawar is also unclear, as coverage of Afghanistan
shifted to explore the Taliban's attempted conquest of the country and its sheltering of
Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda organization. Along with backing the Hazara
157 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press 2001) 112
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minority, Iran also supported the Northern Alliance of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and moderate
Pashtuns opposed to the Taliban.
Enduring Freedom and Its Aftermath (200t-Present)
On September 11, 2001, al Qaeda attacked the United States in an unequalled act
of brutality. With firm evidence that the conspiracy to commit wholesale murder
originated from al Qaeda's leadership in Afghanistan, the United States and its allies
commenced military actions on October 7 known as Operation Enduring Freedom to
destroy the terrorist group and its Taliban hosts. By December, the US had driven the
hard-line fundamentalist regime from power and established the framework for a broad-
based Afghan government to stabilize the country.
Hekmatyar's Lukewarm Revival
Following the catastrophic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Hekrnatyar
quickly arrived to the aid of the Taliban, his former enemies that stole both Pakistani
support as well as the regional and socioeconomic base of support that had previously
benefited Hezb-e Islami. Despite residing in Tehran, Hekrnatyar allegedly began
communicating with the Taliban shortly after September 11. A week after the US-led
Coalition commenced Operation Enduring Freedom, Hekrnatyar provided the Taliban
with "huge quantity of arms, including 12 Stinger missiles.,,161Though the arms procured
from Hezb-e Islami seem virtually insignificant given the Taliban's existing military
hardware, the symbolic gesture from a formerly bitter enemy is striking.
Sometime in February 2002 Hekrnatyar left Iran and returned to Afghanistan.
Facing pressure, Tehran likely urged him to leave to wash their hands of him and
160 William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, 216
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simultaneously create trouble for US forces in Afghanistan.162 With a nonexistent
regional, socioeconomic base compared to the days of the Soviet invasion, Hekmatyar's
plan may be to wave the Islamist flag again, siding with the Taliban and al Qaeda against
the US. Perhaps Hekmatyar may be using this alliance to gain influence in the global
Islamist terror network. Since the beginning of the alliance in fall of 2001, Hezb-e Islami
involvement and participation has only increased, with continued acts and attempted acts
of terrorism against US forces and the Karzai government. His statements converge on
the standard al Qaeda line, consisting of the demonizing of the United States, the urging
of suicide attacks against the West, as well as purported sYmpathy and support for Iraq
before the US toppled Saddam.163 However, the most significant involvement thus far has
been the effective incorporation of Hezb-e Islami into the global Islamist terror network
as the Afghan mouthpiece of al Qaeda. Although Osama bin Laden, his advisor Ayman al
Zawahiri, and his spokesman Suleman Abu Gaith have all previously issued statements
themselves through letters and audio tapes, Hezb-e Islami members have recently
recorded and disseminated a video on behalf of the group, claiming responsibility for the
May 2003 suicide attacks in Riyadh and Casablanca. 164
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Chapter Six:
Conclusions
Hekmatyar's persistence in insurgency is a testament not only to Afghanistan's
exploitable divisions but also to the efficacy of Leninism as a strategy for power. While
foreign support factored heavily into Hekmatyar's persistence and advancement, he
should not be regarded as simply a proxy that fell out of favor with its sponsor.
Hekmatyar is Afghanistan's archetypal survivor, not only persisting but also prospering
in arguably the most dangerous environment of the last 30 years.' A university dropout,
Hekmatyar emerged as one of Afghanistan's most powerful elites, perpetrating dozens of
coup attempts, seizing the position of Prime Minister on two separate occasions, and
bearing responsibility for murder of tens of thousands of civilians. Traditional parties,
particularly those that appeal strictly to ethnic, religious, or socioeconomic
constituencies, have great difficulty in switching bases of support. Choosing certain
alliance partners can alienate traditional support. Hekmatyar has had no trouble in
drawing from religious, ethno-regional, and socioeconomic groups as well as from
foreign sources to wage his war against every Afghan government and opposition group
since the early 1970s and against superpowers of the past and present. Why is Hekmatyar
so persistent? Rather than being tied to a single constituency, he adopted a Leninist
strategy that allows him to manipulate multiple bases of support.
Decapitation - The Body Will Wither
Like Osama bin Laden, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is a dead man walking. There is no
debate among US policymakers as to what action to take should his location be
discovered. One can be confident that Hekmatyar will eventually be captured or killed.
Whether his al Qaeda and Taliban allies betray him or he simply makes a mistake, he is
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in a very vulnerable position; his religious, ethno-regional, and socioeconomic bases of
support seem to have further eroded, and he lacks outside funding. Hekmatyar does not
wield the arsenal of weaponry he once possessed to indiscriminately kill tens of
thousands of Kabul's civilians. Though the details are unclear, his closest associates seem
to be either relatives or die-hard Islamists that supported him from the start at Kabul
University.165Despite cooperation and integration with the SYmbiotic al Qaeda-Taliban
duo, Hekmatyar heads a distinctly domestic Afghan terrorist group. With his removal,
Hezb-e Islami will whither with the loss of its leader. The insatiable die-hards will most
likely absorb themselves completely within the al Qaeda and the Taliban structures,
rendering Hezb-e Islami organizationally defunct. While this study has focused on
Hekmatyar's persistence, there are some broader issues in US foreign and
counterterrorism policy. To conclude, I offer some policy recommendations for US
involvement in Afghanistan.
Policy Recommendations
Accept Decentralization
Currently the Karzai government does not extend far outside Kabul's city limits,
and it is virtually powerless to control the ethno-regional leaders and petty warlords who
control and administer sections of the country. Since the Taliban's collapse, there has
been a wave of calls for the Bush administration to back a vigorous reconstruction of the
country and expand the operating area for the international security forces, currently
165 "Hundreds Arrested over fear of Coup in Kabul," The Guardian April 5, 2002. In the scarce literature on
the group, Hezb-e lslami deputies are never described in depth. Various Reuters, AP and AFP news reports
describe his son as a key member, however details remain extremely vague. See David B. Edwards, Before
Taliban: Genealogies of/he Afghan Jihad (Berkeley, CA: University of Cali fomi a Press 2002). Edwards
seems to reinforce the idea that Hekmatyar's closest aides came from the pool of university lslamists.
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deployed only to Kabul.166 Though a central government that can extend itself into the
peripheries to effectively maintain order, it is important to be realistic and take into
consideration Afghanistan's recent, violent history.
The country's political environment is often defined by both power ambitions as
well as threats. These two factors often bring together seemingly unlikely alliance
partners, such as Islamists and communists or Pashtuns and Uzbeks. Regarding the
reconstruction of Afghanistan, it has often been alleged that the US and its allies are not
doing enough to expand the central government's authority and pacify pockets of
resistance. Ethnic, tribal, and regional groups have a history of autonomy from the central
authority. Afghanistan has seen scores of attempts by a central government to expand and
dominate the periphery, all of which have ultimately failed. The US can assuage the
periphery's fears by keeping a low profile in reconstruction efforts while maintaining key
support for the Karzai government. A sudden and massive attempt to disarm regional
leaders could seriously jeopardize the local population's trust in the United States.
Furthermore, if the US is seen as encroaching on tribal or local norms, it could be
perceived as a threatening actor and rally unlikely allies together in violent opposition of
US actions.
Attempts by the center to consolidate and control the periphery have all failed,
rallying unlikely allies. As long as the major ethno-regional leaders, such as Rashid
Dostum, support the central government and cooperate in the hunt for al Qaeda, the
Taliban and Hekmatyar, the US should accept these leaders' de facto control and the
autonomy they provide. These leaders should be differentiated from warlords, in that they
166 One need only read the New York Times editorials and op-ed columns by Thomas Friedman and
Nicholas Kristoff. For more polemical critiques of the Bush administration's take on Afghan nation
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not only have a representative base but have also demonstrated managerial administration
over large sections of the country. Attempts to disarm these major regional forces will be
met not with suspicion but outright hostility. However, should they side with al Qaeda
and its allies, oppose and obstruct the Karzai government and inhibit US efforts to
revitalize national infrastructure, they should be regarded as threats and treated
accordingly.
However, the sub commanders and lower-level regional warlords present a
greater concern. Even without the leadership and administration experience of larger
ethno-regionalleaders, these autonomous warlords maintain large arsenals of weaponry.
Should economic conditions deteriorate, there is the potential for the al Qaeda- Taliban-
Hekmatyar axis to bribe their support, enlisting their foot soldiers as well as their
weapons. In addition, these warlords are most certain to involve themselves in
Afghanistan's resurging poppy harvests, which undoubtedly arrive in the United States in
the form of processed heroin. Every effort should be made to observe and monitor these
independent warlords to determine the threat they pose.
The US and coalition forces need a stable environment and receptive population
to aid in the hunt for al Qaeda and its allies. Rashly attempting to centralize the country
and disarm regional centers of power, some of which fought along side US Special
Operations Forces against the Taliban and al Qaeda, could draw an unnecessary though
certainly winnable fight, that will deter the Coalition from its objective: the complete and
total destruction of al Qaeda's presence in the region.
building, one can also look at Maureen Dowd's articles.
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Enhance Afghan Army Capabilities
Afghanistan's battlefield environment has changed: Al Qaeda, Taliban and
Hekmatyar's elements seem to have broken into smaller units, residing in South Asia's
cities. Local forces have proven and will continue to prove vital in arresting or killing
hostile forces located in foreign urban environments.167 While the US and coalition forces
should continue counterterrorism operations against the al Qaeda-Taliban-Hekmatyar
axis, Afghan allies can aid in the hunt. Towards this end, an Afghan National Army
would greatly support US regional capabilities. However, the creation of the unit leaves
many questions and conflicts with the above recommendation of accepting
decentralization. If the al Qaeda-Taliban-Hekmatyar axis is operating in smaller units, the
US should at the least train and develop indigenous forces' abilities in scouting,
reconnaissance and other tasks that aid in the tracking of small unit enemy forces.
Those influencing policy should never forget what prompted US forces to operate
in Afghanistan. The liberation of the Afghan people fr0Il! the oppressive Taliban regime
was a virtuous and just cause fulfilled, yet the core mission is the elimination of
September 11's perpetrators and those who support them. Al Qaeda and their allies,
Taliban and Hekmatyar included, pose a threat to regional, international, as well as
homeland security. The quick reconstruction of Afghanistan is a desirable interest,
however the destruction of al Qaeda's international network of terrorism is the most vital
national interest.
Dangerous and fragmented environments like Afghanistan are havens for violent
megalomaniacs such as Hekmatyar, who can draw from multiple bases of support.
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Despite the frequent skirmishes between US forces and the remnants of Islamic militants,
Afghanistan has never enjoyed such a relative degree of tranquility since the fledging
days of the monarchy. If the US and its allies proceed cautiously, incrementally and
responsibly, they can decapitate the Hezb-e Islami organization and prevent the
materialization of other persistent insurgents so that Afghanistan will emerge as a key
regional contributor to the certain victory over al Qaeda.
167 The arrests of high-profile al Qaeda leaders, such as Abu Zubaida, Rarnzi bin al-Shibh, and Khaled
Sheikh Mohammed have been in cities and involved local Pakistani forces acting in cooperation with the
US intelligence community.
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Appendix A: Maps of Afghanistan
Afghanistan - 2002
Source: University of Texas at Austin, Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection
Available at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/afghanistan.html
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Afghanistan by Ethnic Group - 1997
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Af hanistan's Pashtuns b Tribe - Pre-1973
0 If 10() if iCO~ idO I Z60 ;ao:c..0
UZBAk
TURI<OHAN "-'"
~ MAJCR PUSK'Tl./NA¥Ao KUOR lCUNI'I'1!J
OI1RRANnJlJIIAI. 'IS
(6) o.t11.%A1TRIBAl. OHftS
~ H.UCRflH"lC~
~ ~ PlJ5HT\mTRt8lliOS
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Source: Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press 1973)
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Appendix B: Chronology of Modern Afghanistan (1929-2003)
1929
King Amanullah abdicates the throne. Nadir Khan, supported by Pashtun tribal
federation, takes control and is proclaimed king
1933
Nadir Khan assassinated, Zahir Shah assumes the throne
1947
After India is partitioned and Pakistan gains independence, Pashtunistan nationalists
accelerate their
1961
Pakistan and Afghanistan in crisis over Pashtunistan
1964
Zahir Shah's reforms such as an independent media, freedom of speech, and a
democratically elected parliament, approved by grand council.
Increased protests in the universities by communists and Islamists, both opposed to the
central government.
1973
July 17 - Left-leaning Prince Daud topples King Zahir Shah, ending the Afghanistan's
constitutional monarchy
1975
July - Islamists attempt a coup by staging simultaneous revolts across the country. It fails
to ignite a larger revolution. Despite large participation by the Islamists, Hekmatyar who
was a key instigator of the attempt, abstains from commanding his forces. Numerous
Islamist leaders are imprisoned, and executed. Event would catalyze the split between
Hekmatyar's Pashtun radicals and Rabbani's Tajik moderates.
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1977
Daud purges his government of the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) and excludes them from the formulation of a new constitution.
1978
Younis Khalis and the tribal Pashtuns ofNangrahar split from Hekmatyar's Hezb-e
Islami
April 27 - Parcham and Khalq factions of the PDPA unite to overthrow Daud
September - Amin takes control of the PDPA. Moscow fears the instability on its border.
1979
December 27 - The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan and kills Amin
1980
Refugees flee Afghanistan en masse
1983
May - Hezb-e Islami bombs the DRA's Ministry of Interior
December - The US Congress calls for military aid to the Afghan resistance groups
1985
May - Peshawar-based Afghan resistance groups form an alliance with a rotating
presidency.
October - Hekmatyar, after assuming the rotating presidency, snubs President Reagan by
refusing to meet with him.
1986
April - The decision to send Stinger missiles to Afghanistan is approved
September - Stinger missiles arrive in Afghanistan.
September 25 - A Hezb-e Islami Stinger team is the first to use the missiles, downing 3
MI-24D Hind gunships.
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1988
February - With help from Pakistani intelligence, Hekmatyar's forces assassinate
moderate Pashtun and head of the Afghan Infonnation Center, Sayid Bahauddin
Majrooh.
Gorbachev agrees to withdraw Soviet troops over the course of 10 months
August 17 - Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq dies in a plane crash along with US
Ambassador Arnold Raphel and Defense Attache BG Herbert Wassom, USA.
1989
The last of the Soviet troops withdraw
February - Soviets withdraw the last of their forces, as stipulated by the Geneva accords
June - After promising safe passage through Hezb-e Islami territory, Hekmatyar forces
massacre 30 prominent Jamiat commanders
1990
March - Hekmatyar infiltrates Khalq faction of the DRA and attempts a coup along with
Afghan Defense Minister General Tanai. Coup fails and Tanai escapes to Pakistan.
1992
April- The Najibullah regime collapses
April 25 - Hekmatyar claims control of Kabul. A coalition of Tajiks and moderate
Pashtuns fonn to eject Hekmatyar and the Hezb-e Islami from Kabul. Following his
ouster, Hekmatyar's forces take up positions outside Kabul and shell the capital,
beginning what would kill tens of thousands of civilians.
August - Rabbani assumes Presidency. To commemorate his rival's ascendance,
Hekmatyar accelerates the artillery and rocket barrage.
1993
March - Rabbani's Government in Kabul concedes Prime Minister position to
Hekmatyar, hoping he will cease his artillery barrages on the capital.
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1994
September - Taliban captures Hekmatyar's major refueling station and arms depot at
Spin Boldak, along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border
Late October - While the Taliban consolidates its control, Hekmatyar is preoccupied with
fighting Rabbani.
November 5 - Taliban marches into Kandahar as the city's defenders throw down their
arms and join the movement.
December - Taliban seizes Helmand and Zabul provinces, occupying the majority of
Afghanistan's opium fields
1995
January 21 - Hekmatyar attempts to retake area lost in Ghazni to the Taliban but is
beaten back
January 31 - the Taliban gains control ofPaktia and Paktika provinces, areas formerly
under Hekmatyar's influence.
February 14 - the Taliban overruns Hekmatyar's Charasiab headquarters, the strategic
position overlooking Kabul from which Hezb-e Islami shelled the capital.
September 11 - Taliban captures Jalalabad
1996
Osama bin Laden leaves Sudan and takes up residence in Afghanistan
May - In a bid to enlist support against the Taliban, Rabbani' s central government
reaches out to Hekmatyar offering him again the post of Prime Minister. The persistent
insurgent accepts the post, and proceeds to issue Islamist decrees upon entering the
capital.
September - The Taliban defeats Hekmatyar forces at Sarobi and Pul-Charkhi
September 27 - The Taliban takes control of Kabul and executes former DRA Prime
Minister Najibullah who had been residing in the UN Compound since 1992.
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1998
August 20 - Retaliating for twin al Qaeda terrorist attacks on US Embassies in East
Africa, the US Navy launches 80 cruise missiles at bin Laden training camps as well as
the al-Shifa plant in Sudan.
2001
September 9 - Ahmed Shah Massoud fatally wounded by al Qaeda suicide squad posing
as journalists.
September 11 - Al Qaeda terrorist attacks murder 3,000 at the World Trade Center, the
Pentagon, and Somerset County, PA.
October 7 - US commences Operation Enduring Freedom to destroy al Qaeda and the
Taliban
Mid October - Hekmatyar provides his weaponry to the Taliban indicating support
against the US
October 26 - Hekmatyar tells French news service AFP he is in negotiations with the
Taliban to form a united front against the US
November 9 - Taliban evicted from Mazar-e Sharif
November 13 - Kabul liberated
December 7 - Kandahar, the Taliban's spiritual capital, surrenders to Hamid Karzai's
forces
2002
Mid-February - Hekmatyar returns from Iran to plan attacks against the US and the
Karzai government.
March 2 - Coalition forces launch Operation Anaconda to eliminate Al Qaeda and
Taliban forces staging in the Shah-I Kot valley ofPaktia province.
May 6 - CIA-operated Predator drone engages Hekmatyar and his associates on the
outskirts of Kabul. Hekmatyar survives.
Early April- Afghan authorities crackdown on Hezb-e Islami, arresting 350 of its
members. Hekmatyar had planned to launch a wave of bomb attacks to disrupt the grand
council convening in the coming months to formulate a government.
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June - Grand Council meets to form Afghan government. Hamid Karzai appointed
President
September 5 - Car bomb kills 26 in Kabul. Hours later, a gunman targeted President
Karzai in Kandahar. While the gunman's affiliations are unknown, Hekmatyar was
implicated in the bombing.
2003
January 28 - US and Afghan government forces kill at least 18 ofHekmatyar's forces 15
miles north of Spin Boldak along the Pakistani border
January 31 - Al Qaeda-Taliban-Hekmatyar axis detonates roadside"bomb south of
Kandahar, destroying a bus killing 18 Afghans.
February 7 - Hezb-e Islami murders 5 Afghan soldiers and kidnaps 2 others in Helmand
province in the south.
February 19 - US names Hekmatyar as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and
freezes all his known assets.
July 1 - Hekmatyar appears in a video message, urging Afghans to perpetrate terrorist
attacks against the coalition and the Karzai government.
Early July - Hekmatyar reportedly meets with senior Taliban commanders Jalaluddin
Haqqani and Saifur Rahman across the border in Pakistan to coordinate their strategies.
July 19 - US forces kill at least 22 Taliban fighters at Spin Boldak
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Muslim hit and run
Brotherhood) strikes
when he can
Hamid Durrani South Originally President Not
Karzai Pashtun ethno- regional. Karzai leads involved in
the Afghan the fighting
government of the early
in Kabul 90s
Younis Hezb-e Tribal Southeast Ethno-regional If not dead, US-ally in
Khalis Islami Pashtun of Kabul and traditional Khalis is in defeating
breakaway from religious his late Taliban.
Nangrahar 70s/early CIA-
Province 80s. Most of supported
his Commander
commanders Abdul Haq
defected to executed by
the Taliban Taliban
in 1994-5
Mohammed Taliban Ghilzai South, Ethno- Driven from Especially
Omar Pashtun Southeast regional, power by after
socioeconomic, US-led Enduring
religious, coalition. Freedom,
outside support has a
(Pakistan, symbiotic
Saudi) relationship
with al
Oaeda.
Burhanuddin Jamiat-e Tajik Northeast Ethno- Pro-central During
Rabbani Islami regional, government. Taliban
formerly domination,
religious Rabbani
recognized
by UN as
president.
Abdul Rasul Ittehad-e Pashtun East Religious, Maintains Referred to
Sayyaf Islami Foreign armed force by many as
(Saudi) support Unclear exclusively
Saudi proxy
82
Appendix D: Miscellaneous Photographs
Hekmatyar at a 1996 news conference in
Islamabad
Source: Reuters
The Hezb-e Islami Flag
Source: www.afghan-info.com
Al Qaeda Fundraiser Enaam Arnaout (left) with
Hekmatyar (right) in Afghanistan during the
Soviet invasion. After September 11, Arnaout, a
naturalized US citizen, was arrested and
convicted of using a Chicago-based charity
organization to aid Islamic militants.
Source: Reuters
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